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Abstract
The first chapter of this dissertation addresses the impacts of monetary pol-
icy shocks on bank lending behavior in the United States and the role recessions
play through a risk taking transmission mechanism. I employ a vector autoregression
(VAR) identified with sign and zero restrictions to simulate a monetary policy shock
implemented by the Federal Reserve consistent with the economic theory suggesting
unconventional monetary policy measures. I find that banks respond to expansionary
monetary policy shocks by taking additional risk through lowering lending standards,
however banks still experience a compression in lending margins, indicating little
success in their efforts to stabilize reductions in profits. I also include a number
of counterfactual interest rates to allow Fed policy rates to reflect negative interest
rate policies to compare monetary policy shocks across the conventional and uncon-
ventional monetary policy regimes in a consistent manner. I find that banks take
less risk in the unconventional monetary policy regime relative to the conventional
regime, however they experience a larger reduction in lending margins relative to the
pre-Financial Crisis period. Use of a forecast error variance decomposition indicates
the risk channel played a larger role in the post-Financial Crisis period, carrying
implications for Fed policy in considering this particular transmission mechanism in
unconventional monetary policy measures.
The second chapter of this dissertation addresses the foreign central bank
ii
responses of 12 advanced economies and 12 emerging market economies to United
States unconventional monetary policy shocks identified by a combination of sign
and zero restrictions in a global vector autoregression (GVAR) framework. I find
foreign central banks follow in kind with United States unconventional monetary
policy measures, such as Quantitative Easing, in order to offset undesirable spillover
effects. My results also indicate that United States Quantitative Easing plays a
more substantial role in determining monetary easing conditions in emerging markets
than in advanced economies. Additionally, I find foreign central banks with inflation
targeting or floating exchange rate policies tend to follow a United States Quantitative
Easing shock with more stable monetary policy responses, with larger increases in
output than non-inflation targeting or managed exchange rate regimes. My results
are robust to various changes in the specifications and identifying restrictions.
The third chapter was written with Dr. Robert F. Tamura. We introduce a
novel data set to empirically test a dynamic, dynastic human capital model developed
by Tamura, Simon, and Murphy (2016), yielding predictions of the relative efficiency
of school for black and white students during the Jim Crow era. By providing mea-
sures developed within the data set, we can test the parametrizations of key variables
with respect to access to education calibrated within the model. Our results sug-
gest that the model accurately describes the key educational values generated by the
model, and confirms the results of the theoretical framework developed by Tamura,
Simon, and Murphy (2016) in that blacks faced substantially higher marginal costs
of education relative to whites as a result of the lack of equal per-pupil expenditures
allocated at the state level during segregation, lower levels of human capital accu-
mulation of African American parents relative to white parents, and the disparity
of income across both races. This paper contributes to the literature by presenting
a novel data set regarding expenditures per pupil for white and African American
iii
students for the years 1890-1960, and also confirming the fit of the model developed
by Tamura, Simon, and Murphy (2016).
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Chapter 1
Bank Lending and the Risk
Channel of Monetary Policy
1.1 Introduction
Low interest rates maintained by the Federal Reserve after the Financial Crisis
of 2007/2008 led to the adoption of unconventional monetary policy measures. When
the Federal Funds market was rendered inert by the zero lower bound (ZLB) for nom-
inal interest rates, the Federal Reserve altered its policy regime by targeting longer
term interest rates and engaging in Large Scale Asset Purchase programs (LSAPs).
Between November 2008 and October 2014, the Federal Reserve implemented three
rounds of Quantitative Easing, purchasing $4.2 trillion in Treasury and mortgage
backed securities to stimulate economic recovery. Figure 1.1 presents the balance
sheet trends of the Federal Reserve between 2008 and 2018.
As risk taking by financial institutions is considered a factor behind the onset
of the Financial Crisis, analyzing the effects of monetary expansion on this behavior
is of key interest in understanding the implications of monetary policy. As discussed
by Hancock (1985) and Aharony et al. (1986), a changing interest rate environment
can influence banks’ perceptions of risk, in that lower short term interest rates are
1
Figure 1.1: Federal Reserve Balance Sheet Trends: 2008-2018 (in Trillions of Dollars)
related to a reduction in commercial bank profitability. During recessions in the
business cycle, Acharya et al. (2012) and Beck et al. (2006) show that competition
for liquidity and customers can narrow banks’ lending margins and incentivize more
risk taking.
Coined the “risk-taking channel of monetary policy” by Borio and Zhu (2012),
the impact of monetary policy on the willingness of market participants to assume
additional exposure to risk influences financial conditions and ultimately transmits to
increases in aggregate output. There are numerous effects of this channel. The first
effect operates through the basis of valuations, income, and cash flows. Low interest
rates and sizable excess reserves held by financial institutions alter banks’ risk per-
ceptions through increases in the value of real and financial collateral. The increases
in production and incomes lead to a higher tolerance of risk among borrowers. The
second effect ensues when monetary policy shocks impact bank profitability. When
bank profits are threatened and borrowers are more willing to take additional risk,
banks may engage in riskier loans to maintain their profit margins.
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Rajan (2006) and Buch, Eickmeier, and Prieto (2014) discuss conditions where
negative deviations from nominal rate of return targets can induce banks to seek
higher yields to maintain the trust of their investors. As monetary policy shocks
transmit through the economy, a “search for yield” (Rajan, 2006) can affect risk
taking. This search is induced when financial institutions receive lower yields on their
short-term assets relative to long-term liabilities. Thus, banks may alter their holdings
in favor of riskier assets in hopes of garnering higher rates of return. Dell’Ariccia,
Leaven, and Marquez (2014) find affected banks face an adverse selection problem
in assessing borrowers, while macroprudential policies can lead to a credit boom and
lower bank lending standards. As interest rates decline, Maudos and deGuevara
(2004) suggest the increase in banking sector competition can lead to reductions in
lending margins, thereby threatening bank profitability.
The theoretical dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) literature ad-
dresses this channel of monetary policy, with de Groot’s (2014) model implying banks
reduce reliance on debt finance and decrease leverage in response to expansionary
monetary policy shocks. Dell’Ariccia, Laeven, and Marquez (2014) develop a DSGE
that establishes a link between risk-taking behavior and banks’ capital structures.
The empirical literature from Altunbas, Gambacorta, and Marques-Ibanez (2014),
Buch, Eickmeier, and Prieto (2014), Dell’Ariccia, Laeven, and Suarez (2017) suggest
that small and modestly capitalized banks may be more likely to take risk, which can
be explained by a lower demand for loans in the banking sector and an inability to
adjust capital structures. Abbate and Thaler’s (2015) DSGE suggests that monetary
authorities can benefit by stabilizing real interest rates, trading off more inflation
volatility in exchange for less volatility in risk taking and output.
Asset purchases may have different effects as perceptions of risk are mitigated
during various monetary policy regimes. Gertler and Kerati (2011) find that, at the
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ZLB, policies such as central bank credit intermediation can increase production and
inflation, while decreasing interest rate spreads. Meier (2009) has similar findings for
the United Kingdom. Hamilton and Wu (2012) and Stroebel and Taylor (2009) sug-
gest monetary expansion in the form of LSAPs reduce yield spreads. Baumeister and
Benati (2012) find that asset purchase programs in the U.S. and the U.K. assisted in
preventing risks of both deflation and output collapses. These findings are confirmed
by Wieladek and Weale (2016), who employ vector autoregressions (VARs) to identify
a monetary policy shock in the United States and United Kingdom. Schenkelberg
and Watzka (2013) use a similar approach in Japan and also find that LSAPs had
expansionary effects. Wieladek and Weale (2016) identify the existence of the risk
channel of monetary policy operating through perceptions of uncertainty, measured
by the Chicago Board Options Exchange index of implied volatility of the S&P 500
(CBOE VIX) and household uncertainty surveys. While they identify this channel
in the United States, they do not address the impact of risk through bank lending
behavior.
The responses to monetary expansion via changes in risk-taking can be driven
via a number of economic and financial indicators. Bekaert et al. (2013) find a
close relationship between the policy rate chosen by the Fed and measured risks, in
which monetary easing conditions lead to reductions in the CBOE VIX. Bloom (2009)
argues the VIX is a reflection of market uncertainty, while Adrian and Shin (2010),
Bruno and Shin (2015), and Miranda-Agrippino and Rey (2013) argue the VIX is a
reflection of investors’ risk appetites. Weale and Wieladek’s (2016) VARs include the
VIX, household survey measures of uncertainty, interest rate futures, and BBB-AAA
corporate bond spreads. They find that the risk channel of monetary policy played a
non-trivial role in the real economic responses to Quantitative Easing in the United
States. Finally, Neuenkirch and Nockel (2018) argue the expansionary effects can be
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driven through changes in bank lending as a result of increased liquidity, where they
measure risk by the percentage of banks reporting a tightening in credit conditions.1
As central banks have adopted more accomodative monetary policy, the em-
pirical evidence suggests that the zero lower bound has been less binding than previ-
ously considered, and that the effective lower bound may well be below zero (Jobst
and Lin; 2016). Negative interest rate policies adopted in the Euro Area have been
argued to contribute to a modest expansion in financial conditions, however there is
evidence to suggest such policies affect bank profitability (Jobst and Lin; 2016, and
Carbo-Valverde, Cuadros-Solas, and Rodriguez-Fernandez; 2019). Carbo-Valverde,
Cuadros-Solas, and Rodriguez-Fernandez (2019) argue that negative interest rate poli-
cies in the European banking sector have a substantially negative impact on banks’
net interest margins, compared to European economies that do not adopt negative
policy rates. Basten and Mariathasan (2018) discuss how negative interest rates sub-
stantially increase bank operating costs, while portfolio rebalance effects lead to more
lending, and risk-taking reduces capital cushions and liquidity conditions. Demri-
lap, Eisenschmidt, and Vlassopoulos (2017) find that negative interest rate policies
adopted by the European Central Bank lead to banks extending more loans while
holding non-domestic government bonds.2
This paper contributes to the literature in a number of important ways. First,
while a majority of the existing literature on the risk channel of monetary policy uses
bank-level data to explore the relationship between monetary conditions and risk-
taking behavior via panel data methods, I investigate the macroeconomic implications
of this particular channel, similar to Neuenkirch and Nockel (2018). To achieve this, I
1Neuenkirch and Nockel (2018) implement a VAR methodology with bank lending standards as
their variable to account for bank risk-taking.
2As the Federal Reserve has stated on multiple occasions that they have no intention of adopting
negative interest rate policies, empirical studies to address the impact of negative interest rate
policies only exist for foreign economies.
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employ a vector autoregression with Bayesian methods to identify shocks that isolate
the effect of this particular transmission mechanism in which reductions in bank
profitability may induce banks to take more risk. My results indicate that banks
take additional risk in response to monetary policy shocks, however they do not
successfully prevent a compression in lending margins.
Second, I am expanding upon the work of Neuenkirch and Nockel (2018) to
the United States. In order to more accurately reflect the financial and monetary
conditions of the United States, I alter the specification used by Neuenkirch and
Nockel (2018) to align with policy implemented by the Federal Reserve. I use a com-
bination of sign and zero restrictions to identify an exogenous one standard deviation
increase in reserve balances as the shock of interest, with results carring policy impli-
cations regarding the Federal Reserve’s dual mandate, which is to promote maximum
employment and stable prices with a 2% annualized rate of inflation.
Third, I employ a number of counterfactual interest rates to develop a con-
sistent method in which I can compare banking sector responses to monetary policy
shocks via the risk channel across the pre- and post-Financial Crisis regimes.3 When
scaling the impulse responses to be consistent with a 25 basis point cut in the Fed
policy rate across both regimes, my findings suggest that banks take less risk in the
post-Financial Crisis period, however they also experience a larger compression in
lending margins relative to before the onset of the Financial Crisis. These results
are consistent with the findings of Jobst and Lin (2016), Carbo-Valverde, Cuadros-
Solas, and Rodriguez-Fernandez (2019), and Demrilap, Eisenschmidt, and Vlassopou-
los (2017), who address the impact of negative interest rate policies in the Euro area
and the role that the impact on operating costs faced by financial institutions may
3Because the Federal Reserve’s policy tools changed after the Federal Funds Rate reached the
zero lower bound, the use of counterfactual interest rates allow me to identify similar shocks across
two separate vector autoregression models and assess the responses in risk to monetary shocks.
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play in increased risk-taking in the aggregate economy.
Fourth, I employ a forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD) to assess the
contribution of monetary shocks across both regimes, finding that monetary policy
shocks explain more of the variance in the banking sector variables in the unconven-
tional regime. This provides evidence that the risk channel of monetary policy played
a larger role after the Financial Crisis than before, lending to additional implications
for Fed policy to consider the role of this transmission mechanism in setting future
policy measures.
The rest of this paper is as follows: Section 1.2 presents the empirical strategy
to identify a monetary policy shock while constrained at the ZLB, Section 2.3 presents
the results regarding the risk channel of monetary policy to provide insight into
the banking sector responses to innovations consistent with the policy tools used
by the Federal Reserve in response to the Financial Crisis of 2007/08, Section 1.4
explores numerous counterfactual analyses in which I construct a number of Taylor
Rule Specifications and employ a Shadow Federal Funds rate to assess the implications
regarding the Federal Reserve allowing negative interest rates in their policy measures
and the impact it has across risky lending behavior across the two different monetary
policy regimes. I also employ an FEVD to assess the magnitude of the role the risk
channel played in each regime, and finally, Section 3.6 concludes.
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1.2 Empirically Assessing the Risk Channel of Mon-
etary Policy
1.2.1 VAR Estimation
To assess the role the risk channel plays in bank lending behavior, I estimate
a VAR for the period Q4:2008-Q4:2018 with quarterly data, which encompasses the
period during which the Federal Reserve Bank was constrained by the ZLB for short
term nominal rates and resorted to unconventional monetary policy measures such as
QE and Operation Twist. While Quantitative Easing culminated in October 2014,
and the Federal Reserve raised the Federal Funds Rate for the first time since 2008 in
2015, the Federal Open Market Committee has not unwound the Fed’s balance sheet
to a sufficient level to allow for the Fed Funds Rate to operate as the main operating
tool for policy.






′γ + u′t, (1.1)
where yt is a vector of endogenous variables including US data for the log of real GDP,
the log of the core PCE Price Index4, the log of reserve balances held by depository
institutions at the Federal Reserve, Interest on Excess Reserves (serving as the Fed’s
policy rate), the 10 Year Treasury yield (to capture the term structure of interest
rates)5, lending standards, and bank lending margins. Bank lending standards are
4The use of core PCE, excluding energy and food, precludes exogenous price movements stemming
from these two sources, allowing me to establish a parsimonious model without an exogenous oil
price indicator.
5Schenkelberg and Watzka (2013) and Weale and Wieladek (2016) suggest the use of the 10
year government bond yield to reflect the term structure of interest rates during an unconventional
monetary policy regime. As a goal of the Federal Reserve during Quantitative Easing was to flatten
the yield curve, the use of the variable in the VAR specification is appropriate.
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expressed as the net percentage of banks reporting a tightening in lending standards
and is the risk indicator in my estimations. Increases in this variable indicate more
banks are reporting tightening in credit conditions. Thus, in response to monetary
policy shocks with a reduction in policy rates, banks may face an inability to maintain
their profit margins and are thus induced to acquire riskier assets in their “search for
yield”.
Finally, lending margins are the difference between interest rates on new busi-
ness loans and a weighted average interest rate on new deposits from households and
non-financial corporations. Neuenkirch and Nockel (2018) include this in their VAR
as a measure of bank profitability. During recessions in which monetary policy shocks
are present, lending margins face a significant compression, thereby threatening com-
mercial bank profitability. Figure 1.2 presents lending standards and margins over
the period of Q2:1990-Q4:2018, with the shaded areas representing recessions as de-
fined by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). The data show a clear
relationship regarding increases in lending standards during recessions in which bank
demand for liquidity increases and lending begins to tighten. Additionally, while
lending margins have followed a downward trend over the sample period, there is a
noticeable compression during a recession, in which bank profitability through lending
is reduced.
I estimate the VAR with a lag length of 2, as determined by a majority vote
of the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), the Bayes-Schwartz Information Criterion
(BIC), and the Hannan-Quinn Information Criterion (HQ). All data in this specifi-
cation are acquired from the Federal Reserve Economic Database (FRED).
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Figure 1.2: Lending Standards and Margins
1.2.1.1 VAR Identification
The challenge in VAR estimation is to disentangle the orthogonal structural
shocks from the correlated, reduced-form residuals. Traditional VAR methodology
implements a recursive ordering as an identification scheme, however issues arise in
justifying the ordering of the variables.6 A recursive ordering also imposes exclusion
restrictions, which do not naturally arise in DSGE models. An alternative identi-
fication scheme is based on the work of Uhlig (20015), Schenkelberg and Watzka
(2013), Wieladek and Weale (2016), and Neuenkirch and Nockel (2018) and impose
sign restrictions on the reduced form impulse responses.











where A0, is the matrix of contemporaneous autoregressive coefficients, c
∗′ = c′A0,
the matrix A∗` is composed of the structural autoregressive coefficients related to the
reduced form parameters via
6The ordering of the variables is typically from slowest to fastest moving variables.
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A∗` = A`A0, (1.3)
the structural residuals are related to the reduced form residuals
u∗
′
t = utA0, (1.4)
and the reduced form residual variance/covariance matrix is given by
E [utu
′




A0A` is the matrix of lagged structural autoregressive coefficients, and the












t, or by inferring restrictions on A
−1
0 by sign restrictions placed on
the impulse responses, as utilized by Uhlig (2005), Mountford and Uhlig (2009), and
Arias, Rubio-Ramirez, Waggoner, and Zha (2018).
The Bayesian approach to identification with sign restrictions uses a weakly
informative inverted Normal-Wishart prior on the estimated variance/covariance ma-
trix and avoids priors set too tightly to impose bias on the posterior parameters, and
the sign restrictions can persist for k periods, where k ≥ 1. Direct imposition of
the sign restrictions generates a posterior via a Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC)
sampling method and extracts the orthogonal innovations of the VAR using a lower-
triangular Cholesky decomposition of Σ to find A0 based on prior beliefs about the
signs of the impact of a particular shock.7 There are multiple advantages to the
use of sign identification. Sign restriction identification does not contain exclusion
7The Cholesky decomposition serves only as a method of orthogonalization and is not used to
identify shocks.
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restrictions and allows for the contemporaneous transmission between multiple vari-
ables that do not exist in a recursive ordering. It should be of note, however, that
this identification method relaxes the exclusion restrictions on the recursively iden-
tified model, implying that previously unrestricted parameters in A−10 are restricted
instead, and thus the recursive model is not nested within the sign-identified model.
Therefore, the two approaches to identification represent alternatives to one another,
and it is not possible to validate or invalidate implications of a recursively identified
VAR with a sign-identified VAR model.
As I am interested in only one particular shock, I identify elements in one
column of A−10 . This represents the responses of the model’s corresponding variables
to a monetary policy shock via an one standard deviation increase in the Reserve
Balances equation in the VAR.8 A random impulse vector α is drawn from the unit
sphere, and is multiplied by the impulse responses computed from the Cholesky de-
composition of the residuals. If the structural impulse responses match the imposed
sign restrictions, the draw is kept. If not, the draw is discarded and the process
repeats until the number of accepted draws or maximum iterations is reached.
1.2.2 Identifying Restrictions
As the Federal Reserve’s policy tool changed from the Federal Funds Rate to
the quantity of excess reserves held by depository institutions at the Federal Reserve,
I identify an unconventional monetary policy shock by imposing an innovation to
the reserve balance equation. I place positive sign restrictions on reserve balances,
8The Fed’s change in policy tools from the Federal Funds Rate to the level of excess reserve
balances held by depository institutions at the Federal Reserve Bank necessitates an alternative
identification scheme relative to the conventional monetary policy regime in which identification is
performed by imposing a shock to the policy rate equation. This unconventional monetary policy
identification strategy is similar to the scheme employed by Schenkelberg and Watzka (2013) and
Weale and Wieladek (2016).
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the price level, and GDP. In the presence of financial frictions such as the imperfect
substitutability between short and long term bonds or a preferred risk habitat for
investors suggested by Vayanos and Vila (2009), economic theory suggests that LSAPs
will lead to a reduction in long term government bonds by reducing term premia
(portfolio rebalancing effects). Even in the absence of LSAP shocks, announcements
of asset purchases can signal that the policy rate will remain low for longer than
previously expected, and also reduce the long term rate (signaling effects). While
Weale and Wieladek (2016) discuss that one of these two channels can operate (but not
both simultaneously), the risk channel can operate in tandem with either. In addition
to the reduction on the Fed policy rate, I also place a negative sign restriction on the
10 year Treasury Yield. The specifications and identification schemes are similar
to that of Schenkelberg and Watzka (2013) and Wieladek and Weale (2016), who
impose positive sign restrictions to the base monetary aggregate equation in the VAR
to simulate an unconventional monetary policy shock.9
A problem within the sign identified VAR literature is that sign restrictions
do not rule out the existence of other orthogonal innovations with the same pattern
as the shock of interest; each draw can be extracted from a different underlying
structural model. According to Fry and Pagan (2011) the “multiple models problem”
can imply ambiguity in proper identification of the shock of interest. Therefore, Fry
and Pagan (2011), Schenkelberg and Watzka (2013), and Weale and Wieladek (2016)
discuss the benefits of imposing additional sign restrictions to further ensure proper
identification of shocks as a means to address the multiple models problem. The
9Additional sign restrictions on other variables are supported by Schenkelberg and Watzka (2013),
Weale and Wieladek (2016), and Neuenkirch and Nockel (2018). Schenkelberg and Watzka (2013),
Weale and Wieladek (2016), and Neuenkirch and Nockel (2018) impose positive sign restrictions on
consumer prices and negative sign restrictions on the interest rate variables. Nuenkirch and Nockel
(2018) also impose a positive sign restriction on real GDP. The results of Weale and Wieladek
(2016) suggest a positive response in real GDP, further justifying the imposition of this additional
restriction in the identification scheme.
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Table 1.1: Sign Identifying Restrictions
Variable Log Real Log Core Log Reserve Interest on 10 Year Lending Lending
GDP PCE Balances Reserves Treasury Standards Margin
Aggregate Demand Shock
Impact 0
Sign + + +
Aggregate Supply Shock
Impact 0
Sign + − −
Monetary Policy Shock
Impact 0 0
Sign + + + − −
Note: The table shows the sign and zero restrictions on the endogenous variables
applied to identify a monetary policy shock and separate them from other business
cycle shocks.
identification scheme used in the monetary policy shock makes use of additional sign
restrictions (positive restrictions on prices and GDP), and only the banking sector
variables remain unrestricted. The identifying restrictions are included in in Table
2.2. In addition, to overcome the multiple models problem discussed by Fry and
Pagan (2011), I provide the identifying restrictions for demand and supply shocks,
as done by Schenkelberg and Watzka (2013) and Weale and Wieladek (2016). Weale
and Wieladek (2016) argue that in the presence of a demand shock, increases in prices
and output will also lead to a non-negative repsonse in the long term bond yields.
Under a supply shock, output and prices will move in opposite directions and the long
term Treasury yield will be reduced. For the results of the MCMC sampling process,
I present the median impulse response draw and the 68% Bayesian credibility bands
from 10,000 accepted draws.
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1.3 Results
This section presents the results from the VAR estimation. Subsection 1.3.1
presents the impulse responses for the unconventional monetary policy regime, which
are scaled to a one standard deviation increase in the log of reserve balances held
by depository institutions at the Federal Reserve. Subsection 1.3.2 presents the im-
pulse responses for the conventional monetary policy regime, in which the impulse
responses are scaled to a one standard deviation reduction in the Federal Funds Rate.
Subsection 1.4 presents a number of alternative interest rates for the unconventional
monetary policy regime that serve as counterfactuals for the Fed’s policy rate, tehreby
allowing for comparison of the responses of banking sector variables in a consistent
manner. Finally, to investigate the role the risk channel played in each monetary
policy regime, Subsection 1.4.2 presents the FEVD plots regarding the contribution
of an asset purchase shock to the variables included in the VAR across both regimes.
1.3.1 Baseline Specification Results
The impulse responses are presented in Figure 1.3. The impulse responses
presented are scaled to a one standard deviation increase in the log level of Reserve
Balances.10 The results indicate that in response to an asset purchase shock, real
GDP and consumer prices increase by 0.79 and 0.65 percentage points, respectively.
There is a 3 basis point reduction in IOER, and a 58 basis point reduction in the 10
year Treasury yield. The small reduction in IOER is consistent with the observed
data regarding this variable, in that there was little variation over the sample period.
The responses of the banking sector variables are consistent with other VAR
studies addressing bank lending behavior (Abbate and Thaler, 2015; Afanasyeva, and
10Although these are the results from a linear model, the impulse responses can be scaled to reflect
asset purchases of a particular amount during the three rounds of QE.
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Figure 1.3: Unconventional Monetary Policy Shock
Note: This figure shows the median impulse responses in response to a one standard
deviation increase in Reserve Balances, together with the 68% Bayesian credibility sets.
The posterior estimates are acquired by employing a non-informative Wishart prior with
10,000 Monte Carlo draws used to generate the responses.
Guntner; 2014; Neuenkirch and Nockel, 2018). The results suggest that banks reduce
their lending standards by 10.19 percentage points, and lending margins are reduced
by 1.96 basis points.11 These results indicate that in response to a monetary policy
shock, banks lower their lending standards in order to keep lending margins stable
(Neuenkirch and Nockel; 2018). Bekaert et al. (2013) also suggest this behavior in
arguing the existence of a close relationship between Federal Open Market Committee
announcements and measured risk, suggesting banks drastically adjust their lending
behavior in response to policy interventions at the Fed.
The implications of these results being qualitatively similar to Neuenkirch and
Nockel (2018) indicate that as banks attempt to stabilize lending margins, they are
unsuccessful in doing so, as the Bayesian credibility bands for the response in lending
11I report the peak median impulse responses in the discussion of these results.
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Table 1.2: Banking Variable Responses to Monetary Policy Shock (Scaled to Reserve
Balance Increase in Each Round of QE)
Variable QE:I QE:II QE:III QE:I-III
Lending Standards -17.79 -14.83 -15.56 -26.41
(Percentage Points)
Lending Margins -96.02 -80.04 -84.02 -142.51
(Basis Points)
Note: This table shows the peak responses in lending standards and lending margins for
the unconventional monetary policy shock scaled to align with the magnitude of the
increases in reserve balances during each round of Quantitative Easing.
margins suggest more than 68% of the accepted MCMC draws indicate a compression
in lending margins, and thus a reduction in bank profitability through lending.
To assess the magnitudes of the responses of the banking sector variables to
each round of QE, Table 1.2 presents the peak median impulse responses to an asset
purchase shock consistent with QEI-III individually, as well as the responses over the
entire period in which QE was implemented. The first round of QE, which spanned
Q4:2008 to Q2:2010, suggests lending standards were reduced by 17.79 percentage
points, while lending margins compressed by nearly 1% (96 basis points). This was
the most aggressive round of asset purchases, and banking sector variables appear
to respond accordingly. The table also indicates that over the three rounds of QE,
the total effect on lending standards was a 26.41 basis point reduction, and the total
impact on lending margins was 142.41 basis points.
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1.3.2 Conventional Monetary Policy Responses
This subsection estimates and identifies a VAR for the conventional mone-
tary policy regime spanning Q2:1990-Q3:2008. As the Federal Reserve’s policy tools
changed after the onset of the Financial Crisis of 2007/08, estimation and identifica-
tion of a VAR for this period must be altered to reflect the monetary and financial
conditions over the course of the sample period. As such, I alter one variable in the
VAR specification by replacing IOER with the Federal Funds Rate. In addition, I
identify a shock to the policy rate equation (the Federal Funds Rate) in lieu of the
log level of excess reserves by placing a negative sign restriction on the Federal Funds
Rate. The VAR is estimated with a lag length of 2.
The results are presented in Figure 1.4, and suggest that in response to a
one standard deviation reduction in the Federal Funds Rate, equal to a 22 basis point
reduction, real GDP and consumer prices increase by 0.21 and 0.10 percentage points,
respectively, and the 10 Year Treasury Yield is reduced by one percent. The banking
sector variables indicate a reduction in bank lending standards by 26.27 percentage
points and lending margins compress by 6.96 basis points.
As in the unconventional monetary policy regime, the results in this subsec-
tion further support the claims by Neuenkirch and Nockel (2018) in that banks lower
lending standards to stabilize profit margins, however are unsuccessful in doing so.
These results are consistent with Rajan (2006), Buch et al. (2014), and Neuenkirch
and Nockel (2018). The impulse responses show similar qualitative movements com-
pared to the results of Neuenkirch and Nockel (2018), whose study is applied only to
the Euro Area responses to asset purchase shocks at the ECB. Despite the similarities
in qualitiative responses to the baseline VAR specification, comparison of the impulse
responses is not possible, as identification schemes vary across regimes. Therefore, to
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Figure 1.4: Conventional Monetary Policy Shock
Note: This figure shows the median impulse responses in response to a one standard
deviation increase in Reserve Balances, together with the 68% Bayesian credibility sets.
The posterior estimates are acquired by employing a non-informative Wishart prior with
10,000 Monte Carlo draws used to generate the responses.
compare responses between both regimes, there must be a consistent identification
strategy that is employed across each sample period. The following section develops
a number of counterfactual interest rates for the unconventional monetary regime to
compare shocks in a consistent manner to assess variations in risk-taking by banks
during periods with vastly different structural frameworks regarding monetary policy
and regulatory overhauls of the financial sector after 2008.
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Table 1.3: Banking Variable Responses to Monetary Policy Shock (25 and 50 Basis
Point Reduction in the Federal Funds Rate)
Variable 25 bps 50 bps
Lending Standards -29.57 -59.14
(Percentage Points)
Lending Margins -78.39 -156.81
(Basis Points)
Note: This table shows the peak responses in lending standards and lending margins for a
conventional monetary policy shock scaled to align with the magnitude of the decreases in
the Federal Funds Rate.
1.4 Comparison Between Monetary Policy Regimes
This section presents an alternative method of specifying the unconventional
monetary policy VAR with a number of alternative interest rates to serve as counter-
factual policy rates used by the Fed in lieu of reserve balances. I identify monetary
policy shocks through a cut in the Fed’s policy rate, rather than the reserve balance
equation. I construct a Taylor Rule to serve as a counterfactual rate, as well employ
as the Shadow Federal Funds Rate developed by Wu and Xia (2016). This allows for
a more appropriate comparison across regimes to understand the role the risk channel
played in each regime.
1.4.1 Alternative Interest Rates
In this subsection, I employ a set of interest rates that allow me to compare
responses in the banking sector to asset purchase shocks across two different mon-
etary policy regimes. In the previous section, the VARs had differing identification
strategies, as the innovations were imposed on the residual vectors contained in differ-
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Figure 1.5: Federal Funds Rate and Taylor Rule
ent equations in the model. To compare changes in risk-taking following a monetary
policy shock, it is necessary to construct a counterfactual interest rate to reflect mon-
etary policy should the FOMC have opted to engage in negative interest rate policies
rather than using QE as a viable alternative. By including these counterfactual rates,
I can identify shocks to the policy rate equation in both VAR models and analyze
banking sector responses in a more logically consistent manner.
1.4.1.1 Bernanke’s Taylor Rule
The first alternative interest rate I include is a Taylor Rule. By using a Taylor
Rule in place of IOER, I can include a counterfactual policy rate in which there is
no ZLB, and Fed policy measures can achieve negative nominal interest rates. The
Taylor Rule takes the form
rt = r
∗
t + απ(πt − π∗t ) + αy(yt − y∗t ), (1.6)
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Figure 1.6: Impulse Responses to Monetary Policy Shock Using Bernanke’s Taylor
Rule
Note: This figure shows the median impulse responses in response to a one standard
deviation reduction in the Taylor Rule, together with the 68% Bayesian credibility sets.
The posterior estimates are acquired by employing a non-informative Wishart prior with
10,000 Monte Carlo draws used to generate the responses.
where r∗t is the target Federal Funds Rate, πt is core PCE inflation, π
∗
t is the Fed’s
target inflation rate, which is 2.0%, απ is the weight the central bank places on
deviations of inflation from their target, yt is the growth rate in real GDP, y
∗
t is the
growth rate in potential real GDP, and αy is the weight placed on deviations of output
from potential GDP. While the Taylor Rule is typically formulated using coefficients
of 0.5 for both inflation and output deviations, Yellen (2012) and Bernanke (2015)
suggest a more appropriate version of the rule during the unconventional monetary
policy regime would be to assign a weight of 0.25 on the inflation gap, and 1.00 on the
output gap, rather than 0.5 for each. During this formulation, I only use data that was
available to policymakers at the time. Because many of these estimates are revised
over time, it is pertinent to ensure that real-time data is used in the computations
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when developing a counterfactual interest rate for policy choices. Figure 1.5 presents
the Federal Funds rate and the Taylor Rule I compute using απ = 0.25 and αy = 1.00.
The identification scheme in this specification, and all other alternative interest
rate specifications that follow, still imposes a one standard deviation shock to the
reserve balance equation in the VAR, and is thus entirely unchanged from the baseline
estimation. The only difference between the VARs in this subsection relative to the
baseline specification is the use of the alternative policy rate.
The results are presented in Figure 1.6. The peak responses of GDP and
consumer prices, are similar to the responses presented in Figure 1.3, yet with more
lower bound flexibility available in the short-term policy rate, long-term yields are
reduced by less, experiencing a less than 40 basis point reduction, as compared to a
60 basis point reduction in the baseline specification.
As there are different effects being exerted via the term structure of interest
rates, the responses of the banking sector variables change somewhat as well. While
lending standards are only reduced by one percentage point more than in Figure 1.3,
lending margins compress by only 50 basis points, as compared to 196 basis points
in the baseline model. Note that these findings are likely not just the result of a
different interest rate being employed for the Fed’s policy rate, but also that of the
source of the shock and the scaling of the impulse response functions across different
equations.
When the results are scaled to a 25 (or 50) basis point cut in the Taylor Rule
used by Bernanke, lending standards are reduced by 19.63 (39.26) percentage points.
Lending margins, however are compressed by 103.37 (206.74) basis points.
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1.4.1.2 Shadow Federal Funds Rate
As a robustness check on the findings of the counterfactual interest rate anal-
ysis, I include an interest rate not computed via a Taylor Rule; the Shadow Federal
Funds Rate constructed via a term structure of the interest rates model by Wu and
Xia (2016). Figure 1.7 compares the Shadow Federal Funds Rate with the effective
Federal Funds Rate. This shadow rate is employed to reflect unconventional mone-
tary policy as if it were transmitted through short term rates more than long term
rates, with flexibility to allow for an effective lower bound below zero.12
The term structure of the interest rates model used to compute the Shadow
Federal Funds Rate is calibrated in a manner such that the Shadow Rate and the
Effective Federal Funds are equivalent during the conventional monetary policy regime
and after the December 2015 interest rate hike. This, this rate differs from the
Effective Federal Funds Rate only when the Effective rate is at or below 25 basis
points.
The results using the Shadow Federal Funds Rate as the Fed’s policy rate are
presented in Figure 1.8. A one-standard deviation redution in the Shadow Federal
Funds Rate is a 40 basis point cut, requiring a sizable re-scaling to compare the
peak median impulse responses across the different specifications. Compared to the
Bernanke Taylor Rule specification, the peak reduction in the policy rate is 11 basis
points.
The responses of real GDP and consumer prices are still somewhat consistent
with the results from the previous unconventional monetary policy specifications in
this paper. The reduction in the 10 Year Treasury yield is roughly 50 basis points.
12Neuenkirch and Nockel (2018) employ this as a counterfactual inteerest rate in the Euro Area,
arguing more lower bound flexibility via this shadow rate serves as an alternative to Quantitative
Easing for more adequate comparison between the two monetary policy regimes used by the ECB.
I employ this shadow rate for the U.S. as a similar exercise.
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Figure 1.7: Effective Federal Funds Rate and Shadow Federal Funds Rate
The banking sector responses suggest a 10.75 percentage point reduction in
lending standards, and a 130 basis point compression in lending margins. This sug-
gests that banks take less risk, yet experience less profitability in response to a mon-
etary policy shock. As in the other Taylor Rule specifications, adequate comparison
will require a re-scaling of the impulse responses, which are provided in section 1.4.3.
When the results are scaled to a 25 (or 50) basis point cut in the Shadow Rate,
lending standards are reduced by 6.75 (13.50) percentage points. Lending margins,
however are compressed by 81.25 (162.50) basis points. This shows a much smaller
redution in lending standards compared to the Bernanke Taylor Rule.
The results show that as there is more variability in the policy rate (compared
to interest on excess reserves or the Bernanke Taylor Rule), banks reduce their lending
standards by less, and there is a more substantial reduction in lending margins. This
lends evidence to suggest that as banks will take risk to stabilize profit margins,
however the term structure of the interest rates plays a substantial role in the amount
by which lending margins compress.
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Figure 1.8: Impulse Responses to a Monetary Policy Shock with the Shadow Federal
Funds Rate
1.4.2 Forecast Error Variance Decomposition
To assess the role the risk channel played in each monetary regime, I employ
a forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD). I compare the FEVD plots for each
regime, as provided in Figures 1.9 and 1.10. The FEVD plot for the unconventional
monetary policy regime uses the baseline model, as this specification and accompa-
nying identification method is consistent with the policy tools used by the Federal
Reserve during Quantitative Easing. The FEVD plots for the alternative interest
rates used to compare risk across the two monetary policy regimes are presented in
Appendix A.2.
The FEVD analysis suggests despite the larger cuts in lending standards dur-
ing the conventional monetary policy regime relative to the unconventional regime, a
monetary policy shock explains 15% of the variation in the conventional period, and
21% of the variance in the unconventional regime. The variance in lending margins
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Figure 1.9: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition (Unconventional Monetary Pol-
icy)
explaineed by a monetary policy shock suggest similar behavior, with 16% of the vari-
ation in lending margins explained during the conventional monetary policy regime,
and 23% of the variation in lending margins explained during the unconventional
monetary policy regime.
The FEVDs therefore suggest that, while the differences are somewhat small,
the risk channel of monetary policy appears to have operated more during the un-
conventional monetary policy regime than the conventional period. This is consistent
with other measures of risk argued by Weale and Wieladek (2016) to serve as indica-
tors of uncertainty in the economy. For example, the VIX, AAA-BBB bond spreads,
and household uncertainty indicators all showed substantially more variability dur-
ing the unconventional monetary policy regime relative to the conventional period.
As such, economic agents are more observant of risk following the Financial Crisis
than before, and thus monetary policy shocks are more likely to signal economic
stabilization in a regime more sensitive to risk.
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Figure 1.10: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition (Conventional Monetary Policy)
The FEVD plots for the alternative interest rates used in the comparison of
risk across monetary policy regimes suggest similar results to the baseline specifica-
tion’s FEVD plots, with implications that the risk channel played a larger role in
the unconventional monetary policy regime than the conventional period. Using the
Bernanke Taylor Rule, the FEVD plots indicate that 15% of the variance in lending
standards and 22% of the variance in lending margins is explained by a monetary
policy shock. The Shadow Federal Funds Rate specification provides additional ev-
idence that the risk channel played a larger role in the conventional regime, with
40% of the varience in lending standards and 25% of the variance in lending margins
being explained by a policy rate reduction. Thus, across all specifications used in this
paper, the findings indicate the risk channel played a more important role in the the
unconventional monetary policy regime than the conventional monetary regime, in
which the Federal Funds Rate was used as the Fed’s policy tool.
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Table 1.4: Banking Variable Responses to Monetary Policy Shock
Variable Period 25 bps Cut in 50 bps Cut in
Policy Rate Policy Rate
Lending Standards Conventional -29.57 -59.14
(Percentage Points) Unconventional (Bernanke) -19.63 -39.26
Unconventional (Shadow Rate) -6.75 -13.50
Lending Margins Conventional -38.42 -76.84
(Basis Points) Unconventional (Bernanke) -103.37 -206.74
Unconventional (Shadow Rate) -81.25 -162.50
Note: This table shows the peak responses in lending standards and lending margins for
both conventional and unconventional monetary policy regimes.
1.4.3 Policy Implications
The results of the peak median impulse responses scaled to a 25 (50) basis
point cut in the Fed’s policy rate are presented in Table 1.4. When the impulse
responses from the alternative interest rate specifications are scaled to either a 25
(50) basis point cut in the Federal Reserve’s policy rate, comparison across rates
suggest that as there is more lower bound flexibility, banks respond with less risk via
a reduction in lending standards, yet also experience a larger compression in lending
margins. Howeer, the variance in the policy rates appears to play a substantial role
in the response in the banking sector variables. The Shadow Federal Funds Rate
allows for less lower bound flexibility (minimum of 3.25%) than the Bernanke Taylor
Rule (minimum of 5.75%), however also displays an upward spike once the Effective
Federal Funds Rate reached the ZLB.
Comparing the banking sector responses across the two monetary policy regimes
and the alternative interest rate variables used in lieu of Quantitative Easing for un-
conventional monetary policy, the results indicate banks take less risk via a lending
standard reduction in the unconventional monetary policy regime. During the con-
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ventional monetary policy regime, a 25 basis point cut in the Fed Funds rate is
consistent with a 29.57 (59.14) percentage point reduction in lending standards along
with a 38.42 (76.84) basis point compression in lending margins. The unconventional
regime suggests that under the Bernanke Taylor Rule, banks reduce lending standards
by 19.63 (39.26) percentage points, and experience a 103.37 (206.74) percentage point
compression in lending margins. The Shadow Federal Funds Rate specification shows
a 6.75 (13.50) reduction in lending standards accompanied by an 81.25 (162.50) com-
pression in lending margins. Despite the large difference in lending standards between
these two interest rates there is a similarity in lending margin compression between
these two specification.
The smaller reduction in lending standard reduction in the unconventional
monetary policy regime is consistent with the data on the total value of loans issued
by banks in the post-Financial Crisis period. With interest paid on excess reserves, in
conjunction with a perceieved lack of credit-worthy borrowers following the initiation
of QE as the Fed’s policy tool, the level of Commercial and Industrial loans were
reduced, and continued to fall until the beginning QE:II in Q2:2011. As such, if
banks are unwilling to reduce lending standards after the Financial Crisis relative
to before, the larger compression in lending margins suggests that while banks are
unsuccessful in stabilizing their lending margins, the reduction in lending standards
plays some role in the response of lending margins.
When considering both the alternative interest rates and the FEVD plots,
the evidence suggests the Federal Reserve Bank would be well-served to take the
risk channel into consideration when drafting future monetary policy measures. The
empirical evidence regarding other transmission mechanisms during QE indicate the
portfolio rebalancing channel operated in tandem with the risk channel. As the
portfolio rebalancing channel operates through a reduction in long term yield with
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increases in asset prices and the risk channel is activated through perceptions in risk
and uncertainty in durable consumer goods markets, financial markets (Weale and
Wieladek; 2016) and the banking sector, the dual mandate may not be sufficient to
adequately stabilize the economy via monetary policy measures enacted by the Fed.
The dual mandate, which currently exists to minimize unemployment and maintain an
annual inflation rate (via the Personal Consumption Expenditures Price Index, which
does not include asset prices) of 2%, does not explicitly address risk, uncertainty, or
asset price variation. Thus, as lending behavior can significantly respond to monetary
policy shocks, if the Fed does not address this particular transmission mechanism,
there may be a buildup of risk in the credit system that is not being considered in the
current monetary policy framework. Thus, a reappraisal of the dual mandate may be
necesary during the current monetary policy regime.
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1.5 Conclusion
This paper investigates the role the risk channel of monetary policy plays in
bank lending behavior in the determination of compressions in bank lending margins.
In response to the Great Recession, the United States Federal Reserve engaged in
three rounds of Quantitative Easing as a measure of unconventional monetary policy
designed to influence real economic activity while short term rates were at the zero
lower bound. I estimate vector autoregression (VAR) models identified with a combi-
nation of sign and zero restrictions to compare responses in bank lending standards to
expansionary monetary shocks during different policy regimes to address the changes
in risk-taking and the ability to stabilize bank lending margins. My first VAR esti-
mation for the unconventional regime identifies a shock to reserve balances, however
to compare the amounts of risk banks are willing to take to stabilize lending margins
across both regimes, I estimate a number of VARs with alternative interest rates to
act as a substitute for QE, and identify shocks to the Fed’s policy rate equation.
When compared across regimes, I find banks take less risk during the unconventional
monetary policy regime compared to the conventional regime. While banks take
more risk in the conventional regime, my results indicate a much larger compression
in lending margins during the unconventional regime. This is consistent with the
data regarding bank loans after the Financial Crisis of 2007/08. The findings are ro-
bust across various specifications, and the forevast error variance decompositions for
each specification indicate the risk channel plays a larger role in the unconventional
monetary policy regime.
My results have significant policy implications with respect to the current
structure of monetary policy in the United States. The Federal Reserve currently
operates under the dual mandate, which is to minimize unemployment and maintain
32
a stable annualized inflation rate of 2%. As the empirical evidence suggests the real
economy responded through transmission mechanisms of unconventional monetary
policy that operated via substantial movements in financial market and banking sector
variables, the Federal Reserve would be well-suited to consider the risk channel in
future policy initiatives. Failure to do so may result in a buildup of risk in the credit
system, leading to future financial crises. As the Fed’s current price index used for
monitoring of inflation does not include asset prices, it would be prudent to at least
consider equity markets when enacting future monetary policy measures.
Research in this particular channel of monetary policy opens a number of
avenues for future projects. First, it would be prudent to more accurately assess the
role of moral hazard by separating the Federal Reserve Bank’s balance sheet during
the unconventional monetary policy regime to individually identify shocks to their
holdings of Treasury and Mortgage Backed Securities. As the Fed’s asset purchases
during QE were unprecedented in both size and composition, addressing shocks to
these two components of their balance sheet would address how perceptions of risk
responded to changes across both public and private debt acquisition. Second, further
investigation to the response of perceptions of risk in both financial markets and the
banking sector through different counterfactual interest rates that allow for variations
in lower bound flexibility in policy rates in lieu of QE would provide evidence regarding
the role the term structure of interest rates plays in determining how the risk channel
operates during the unconventional monetary policy regime. Third, in using numerous
counterfactual interest rates across different monetary policy regimes, an alternative
estimation procedure may be to use a non-linear, state dependent VAR to include the
full sample in one model estimation, rather than separating them into two separate
VARs. Finally, as the risk channel can operate through consumer confidence, financial
market, and banking sector sub-channels, it would be interesting to identify the role
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each plays in the overall activation of this transmission mechanism of monetary policy
in the United States.
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Chapter 2
Spillovers of United States
Quantitative Easing: What are the
Foreign Monetary Policy
Responses to US Monetary Policy
Shocks?
2.1 Introduction
The decade following the Financial Crisis of 2008 witnessed the introduction
of unconventional monetary policy (UMP) conducted by various central banks when
short term nominal interest rates approached the zero lower bound (ZLB). United
States UMP measures were composed of programs such as Quantitative Easing (QE)
and Operation Twist. Between 2009 and 2014, the Federal Reserve implemented
three rounds of QE, ultimately purchasing $4.2 trillion in Treasury and Mortgage
Backed Securities, as presented in Figure 2.1. The goals of QE were to lend to
financial institutions, directly provide liquidity to markets affected by the financial
crisis, and purchase long term Treasury and mortgage-backed securities to lower yield
spreads, encourage lending, maintain their inflation target, and ultimately stimulate
real economic activity.
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Figure 2.1: Federal Reserve Balance Sheet Trends: 2008-2018 (in Trillions of Dollars)
Given the vast financial and trade integration with the global economy, impli-
cations regarding the effects of QE extend well beyond United States borders. Rey
(2013), Bekaert et al. (2013), Miranda-Agrippino and Rey (2015), Passari and Rey
(2015) and Georgiadis (2016) argue global events are largely determined by United
States monetary policy measures. However, recent evidence suggests heterogeneous
responses between advanced economics (AE) and emerging market economies (EME).
In a flexible exchange rate world, the Mundell Fleming-Dornbusch model sug-
gests expansionary monetary policy in the home economy generates an exchange rate
depreciation, reducing the prices of home goods relative to foreign goods. This re-
duction in relative prices leads to increases in the demand for home goods by both
domestic and foreign countries. Should foreign central banks fail to respond through
expansionary monetary policy to mitigate spillover effects that travel through the
exchange rate, a “beggar-thy-neighbor” effect ensues, in which foreign output falls as
a result of the increase in demand for the domestically produced goods.
The empirical evidence does not favor such an effect, however. Eichenbaum
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and Evans (1995), Kim and Roubini (2000), Kim (2001), Faust and Rogers (2003),
Faust et al. (2003), Canova (2005), Nobili and Neri (2006), Mackowiak (2007), Blue-
dorn and Bowdler (2011), Abdelfaki and Feki (2012), and Aizenman, Chinn, and Ito
(2016) find evidence of increases in foreign output and prices following expansionary
monetary policy in the United States, however the magnitude of these increases are
at least partially dependent upon their levels of trade integration with the United
States. The movements of foreign macroeconomic variables are consistent with a
“prosper-thy-neighbor” effect, in which foreign central banks align themselves with
monetary policy measures set by the United States.
There is a wealth of dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) litera-
ture addressing foreign central bank responses after monetary expansion in a home
country. Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) develop a micro founded open economy New
Keynesian DSGE model with nominal rigidities to show a beggar-thy-neighbor ef-
fect can ensue following a monetary policy shock originating in the home country.
Carida et al. (2002) further expand upon these models to incorporate inflation/output
tradeoffs with international spillover effects to illustrate the benefits from monetary
policy coordination between foreign central banks. Levine, Pearlman, and Pierse
(2007) introduce ZLB constraints, finding welfare gains from commitment to policy
announcements and cooperation between foreign monetary authorities. Alpanda and
Kabaca’s (2017) DSGE is developed and calibrated specifically for the QE period in
the United States. Their model incorporates real and nominal rigidities with portfo-
lio rebalancing effects to show a depreciation in yield from QE generating currency
appreciation pressures abroad. Foreign monetary policy responses lead to lower bond
yields, stimulating the global economy. They additionally show the model produces
similar qualitative effects for both pre- and post-QE periods, with the pre-crisis pe-
riod generating substantially smaller quantitative responses. Kolasa and Wesolowski
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Figure 2.2: Short and Long Term Interest Rates: Advanced and Emerging Market
Economies
(2018) develop a DSGE in which they show QE policies originating in AEs generate
substantially different spillover effects when compared to emerging economies EMEs.
While AEs tend to receive positive spillovers in output, EME responses indicate tem-
porary decreases in aggregate output; providing an implication for the benefits of
EME central bank counter cyclical monetary policy measures to prevent beggar-thy-
neighbor effects from materializing.
The empirical studies of the impacts of United States QE support the results
of Alpanda and Kabaca (2015) and Kolasa and Wesolowski (2018), in that foreign
42
central banks respond with asset purchases of their own to stimulate their home
economies. Chen et al. (2012), Eichengreen (2013), and Georgiadis (2016) suggest
favorable responses of AEs to QE, with increases in both output and inflation, while
EMEs have much more diverse effects. There are two distinct and opposing views
on the influence of QE in the developing world. Lavigne et al. (2014) argue QE
was necessary to prevent declines in United States production during the recession
to allow exports to meet the product demands of foreign economies, thus stimulating
real activity in EMEs. Chen et al. (2012) and Barroso et al. (2015) suggest QE led
to higher inflation in many EMEs, especially in Latin America and Asia.
With respect to the mechanisms of monetary policy, economic theory implies a
number of ways in which asset purchases may affect the real economy. First, monetary
policy can spillover through the exchange rate, as suggested by the Mundell Fleming-
Dornbusch model. QE generates spillovers to foreign markets through devaluation
of the dollar relative to other currencies. Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) provide
evidence for this channel as a potential transmission mechanism of United States
monetary policy into foreign economies.
A second potential mechanism operates through bond yields. As discussed by
Alpanda and Kabaca (2015), appreciation pressure on foreign currency can lead to
a reduction in interest rates in the rest of the world as a result of the decline in the
term premium component of United States long term rates. The portfolio rebalance
channel is activated when lower long term United States bond yields induce foreign
investors to alter the composition of their portfolio holdings through an increased
demand for substitutable assets. Ultimately, this channel lowers risk premia and
boosts asset prices, leading to reductions in yield for foreign economies, ultimately
easing financial conditions in both AEs and EMEs. Evidence for this channel is
provided by Vayanos and Vila (2009), Albertazzi, Becker, and Boucinha (2012), and
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Weale and Wieladek (2016).
This paper investigates the monetary policy responses to United States QE in
twelve AEs and twelve EMEs. My results show AEs and EMEs both follow in kind
with United States monetary expansions. I find that QE affects long term yields in
AEs, and short term yields in EMEs. Figure 2.2 presents the average of short and
long term interest rates in AEs and EMEs. Many AEs faced policy constraints by
short term interest rates being at or near the ZLB, whereas EMEs had much higher
short term rates. Thus, EMEs were able to defer to conventional monetary policy
measures to affect short term yields while AEs were not.
I also find AEs are likely to experience larger responses in output, while EMEs
respond more through increases in consumer prices, confirming the view held by Chen
et al. (2012) and Barroso et al. (2015). I find the largest increases in consumer prices
in Latin American countries and Turkey. I investigate the relative contribution of
a QE shock to foreign variables, finding EME monetary policy is more likely to be
influenced than AE policy. My results are robust to changes in the specification and
identifying restrictions.
I contribute to the literature in five ways. First, while many previous stud-
ies such as Kim and Roubini (2000), Kim (2001), Faust and Rogers (2003), Faust
et al. (2003), Canova (2005), Nobili and Neri (2006), Mackowiak (2007), Bluedorn
and Bowdler (2011), and Abdelfaki and Feki (2012) investigate the effects of global
output spillovers resulting from United States monetary policy, they are modeled
using bilateral two-country VAR models. These models include United States vari-
ables and the variables of one other economy. While the results of these studies
suggest United States monetary policy has substantial spillover effects in both AEs
and EMEs, they suffer from methodological constraints, as their structure does not
allow for the multilateral nature of intertwined cross-country and global effects. As
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United States monetary policy may influence global economic conditions, there are
third party and feedback effects that cannot be captured with a traditional bilateral
VAR model. In adopting the global vector autoregression (GVAR) methodology de-
veloped by Pesaran, Schuermann, and Weiner (2004) and Pesaran and Smith (2006),
I allow for a more complete analysis of foreign economy responses to spillovers from
QE in the United States.
Second, I use Bayesian methods to identify global spillovers to a United States
QE shock with a combination of sign and zero restrictions. The conventional iden-
tification scheme for a GVAR is to employ a generalized impulse response function,
which does not allow for the inclusion of any a priori economic theory, however as
discussed by Pesaran (2007), it serves as an alternative to imposing an implausible
number of identifying restrictions that are not necessarily justified in the interna-
tional macro literature. Recently, the GVAR literature has adopted the method of
sign restrictions identification to assess spillovers of various economic shocks.1 Sign
identification has an added advantage of alleviating the requirement of a large number
of identifying restrictions to identify shocks of interest.
Third, I investigate foreign monetary policy responses to QE. While many
studies investigate foreign central bank responses to conventional monetary policy
measures from the Fed, the literature on UMP spillover responses is relatively scarce.2
I provide evidence regarding the responses of foreign central banks to QE in the
United States, where AEs experience large responses in production and EMEs have
more sizable increases in consumer prices. In addition, I find central banks with
1Chudik and Fratzscher (2011), Georgiadis (2016), and Anaya, Hachula, and Offermanns (2016)
employ GVARs identified with sign and zero restrictions to investigate spillover effects of develop-
ments within the United States policy after the 2008 financial crisis.
2See Eichenbaum and Evans (1995), Kim and Roubini (2001), Faust and Rogers (2003), and Blue-
dorn and Bowdler (2011) for foreign central bank responses to United States conventional monetary
policy measures.
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inflation targeting policies have more stable responses than central banks with no de
jure targeting policy after a QE shock. I also group economies by their exchange rate
characteristics. I find that while economies with floating exchange rates have less
aggressive monetary policy responses than managed exchange rate regimes, floating
exchange rates do not serve as a buffer to allow central banks to enjoy complete
monetary policy independence. These findings support the conclusions of Rey (2013)
with respect to the Mundell Fleming trilemma, in which a central bank may have two
of the three: fixed exchange rates, free capital flows, or monetary policy independence.
Fourth, I assess the relative importance of a United States QE shock to foreign
variables via forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD) analysis. While I find
that spillover effects appear to propagate through bond yield and real exchange rate
channels for both AEs and EMEs, a QE shock from the United States explains more
variance in EME monetary variables than AEs, suggesting QE spillovers play a larger
role in the determination of EME monetary policy than AEs.
Finally, I shed light on the possible channels through which QE may have been
propagated. First, as discussed by Vayanos and Vila (2009), Weale and Wieladek
(2016), I find evidence of a portfolio rebalance channel in many AEs and a small
number of EMEs. I also find EMEs operate through short term interest rate channels,
while AEs respond more through long term interest rates. Next, I find evidence of
activation of an exchange rate channel in nearly all economies in my sample.3 My
results are consistent with the existing literature.4
The remainder of this paper is as follows; Section 2.2 introduces the GVAR
model, data used in my estimations, and an explanation of identification through
3See Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) for responses of real exchange rates to United States conven-
tional monetary policy spillovers.
4See D’Amico and King (2010), Gagnon et al. (2012), Hamilton and Wu (2012), and Bauer and
Rudebusch (2014).
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sign and zero restrictions. Section 2.3 presents the results with impulse responses,
forecast error variance decomposition analysis, and a number of robustness checks,
and Section 3.6 concludes.
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2.2 Estimating Spillovers of Quantitative Easing
To assess spillover effects of QE and foreign central bank responses, I employ
a GVAR developed by Pesaran et al. (2004).The GVAR method employs a two step
procedure. In the first step, I estimateN country-specific VAR models with exogenous
variables (VAR-X). In the second step I combine and stack the VAR-X estimate to
solve them as one large global model in which the foreign blocks of exogenous variables
for every country are now treated as endogenous and weighted by proportional trade
flows. Following my discussion of the reduced form GVAR estimation in this paper,
I present the data and the strategies used to identify a United States QE shock via
sign and zero restrictions.
2.2.1 GVAR Methodology
The motivation of a GVAR is to estimate a VAR of global dimension containing
i = 1, ..., N countries, each with ki variables such that k =
∑N
i=1 ki. The VAR takes
the form
yt = c +
p∑
`=1
A`yt−` + ut, (2.1)








is the vector of k
endogenous variables stacked over N countries, A` is a k×k matrix of autoregressive
coefficients, and ut is a k × 1 vector of reduced form residuals. As the number of
parameters will be large, even with a small N , estimation of this large scale VAR
with a short time sample is not possible.
Pesaran and Smith (2007) propose a large scale VAR by estimating a condi-
tional VAR-X model for each of the N economies in the sample, which are linked
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linked via bilateral trade flows. The conditional VAR-X for each individual country
i = 1, 2, ..., N is








i,t−l + ui,t, (2.2)
where yi,t is a vector of ki endogenous variables, Ai,` is a ki × ki matrix of lagged
autoregressive coefficients, A∗i,` is a matrix of coefficients for the exogenous foreign
variables, and y∗i,t is a vector of k country-specific weakly exogenous foreign variables.
The distinguishing feature of GVAR estimation is in the set of foreign ex-
ogenous variables y∗i,t, which are expressed as weighted averages of other countries’








wi,j = 1, (2.4)
and wi,j ≥ 0 ∀ i 6= j and wii = 0. The bilateral trade weights capture the exposure
of country i to country j as a share of country i’s total trade flows. The foreign
variables y∗i,t are assumed to be weakly exogenous with respect to the parameters in
the VAR-X models given by Equation 2.2.
After a VAR-X is estimated for each of the N countries in the sample, the
coefficient estimates are combined and stacked to form one large global VAR. This
global form of the VAR allows for the existence of interdependencies between each set
of country-specific domestic variables, treating every variable as endogenous in the
reduced-form GVAR.
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If I let yt be the k × 1 vector of all observable variables, I stack the country
specific conditional models to produce
yt = c +
p∑
`=1
A`yt−` + ut, (2.5)
where




A′` = [A1,`W1, A2,`W2, ... , AN,`WN ]
′. (2.7)
The global solution is equivalent to that of the reduced form VAR expressed
in Equation 2.1, but with numerous interlinkages between the k variables and N
countries. The global VAR in reduced form can be used to perform standard VAR
analysis and obtain the structural impulse response functions for statistical inference.
The method of identification via sign and zero restrictions in this paper is presented
in subsection 2.2.4.
2.2.2 Data
All VAR-X models in this paper are estimated with monthly data for the period
when asset purchases were an active policy tool at the Federal Reserve (January 2007
to October 2014). Additionally, I use a lag length of 1 for each VAR-X in my analysis.
With the inclusion of the United States, my sample comprises twenty five monetary
areas listed in Table 2.1. A description of the data sources is provided in Table 7.
The United States vector of endogenous variables y1,t I estimate is composed
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Table 2.1: Monetary Areas Included in Analysis
Advanced Economies
United States Australia Canada Denmark
Eurozone Iceland Israel Japan
New Zealand Norway Sweden Switzerland
United Kingdom
Emerging Market Economies
Brazil Chile China Colombia
Czech Rep. Hungary India Mexico
Poland Russia South Korea Turkey
of the log of the Industrial Production Index, the log of the Personal Consumption
Expenditures Index, the log of a narrow money index (used to reflect the monetary
base), the 90 Day Treasury yield, the 10 Year Treasury yield, the log of the S&P 500
Stock Price Index (in real terms, using January 2009 as the base price), and the real
effective exchange rate of the U.S. dollar against all other major trading currencies.5
The vector of foreign variables enters y∗1,t Equation 2.2, containing the log of
industrial prodution, log of the price level, the log of a narrow monetary aggregate
index, a 90 day government bond yield, a 10 year government bond yield, the log of
a stock price index (in real terms, using January 2009 as the base price), and the real
effective exchange rate index.6
5All variables except yields are expressed as log-levels in my estimation.
6The 3 month government bond yield is not available for Colombia and I use the short term
policy rate in its place.
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2.2.3 Construction of the Weight Matrix
The weight matrix aggregates the vector of foreign variables in each VAR-X
equation to a weighted sum. This permits the variables in all other countries to influ-
ence the corresponding variables in an individual country’s model without selecting
specific countries while omitting others. The weight matrix for country i reflects the
relative importance of foreign economic developments on domestic conditions con-
tributed by country j.
I use one weight matrix in my specification. This matrix is constructed using
annual bilateral trade data from the IMF Direction of Trade Statistics. My main
specification uses an average of the data from 2008 to 2014.7
2.2.4 Identification Strategy
Identification of shocks within a GVAR framework is complicated by the large
dimension of the global model. The requirements for identification of a GVAR are
the same as in any VAR model; identification needs k(k − 1)/2 restrictions.8 While
this number of restrictions is usually feasible for a small number of countries, Chudik
and Pesaran (2016) discuss the difficulties in imposing them in a global framework,
in that justification of such a large number of identifying restrictions is not provided
in the existing open economy macro literature. The extant literature only focuses
on distinguishing between types of shocks, without providing insight regarding the
country-specific origins required to identify all shocks within the GVAR model.
7As I am interested in a monetary policy shock, it is important to note that there is the possibility
my results are being driven by the bilateral trade flows for each country. To control for this, I include
a set of estimations of the GVAR with pre-crisis trade weights as a robustness check, which span
January 2000 to December 2006.
8See Bernanke (1986), Blanchard and Watson (1986), and Sims (1986) for contemporaneous
restrictions on the variance/covariance matrix. For long run restrictions, see Blanchard and Quah
(1989), Clarida and Gali (1994), and for sign restrictions, see Uhlig (2005), Mountford and Uhlig
(2009), Arias, Rubio-Ramirez, Waggoner, and Zha (2018).
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Dees et al. (2007) and Chen et al. (2012) suggest a Cholesky decomposition for
each country, with an additional assumption that the United States economy affects
but does not contemporaneously respond to developments in other countries. This
is equivalent to placing the United States VAR-X∗ model as the first country block
in the GVAR. While a Cholesky decomposition is plausible for each country, a full
ordering is implausible given the high dimensionality of the model.
Other methods of identification would include a priori restrictions on the
contemporaneous variance/covariance matrix of shocks, long run restrictions on the
impulse responses, or by sign restrictions, but all are complicated by cross-country
interactions and the high dimensionality of the model.9 Pesaran et al. (2004), Pesaran
and Smith (2006), and Dees et al. (2007) adopt the generalized impulse response
function (GIRF) to overcome the identification problems associated with the large
dimensionality of the GVAR. The advantage of the GIRF is that it is invariant to the
ordering of the variables in the VAR. Rather than using a Cholesky decomposition
to orthogonalize the shocks in the model, Pesaran and Shin (1997) employ a shock
to the jth element of the VAR and integrate out the effects of other shocks using
the historically observed distribution of the residuals. Unfortunately, the GIRF falls
short of practical use because it does not identify shocks via a priori economic theory,
and thus are difficult to interpret in a meaningful economic context.
The implementation of sign restrictions is a viable alternative to other forms
of identification in a GVAR10, however full identification is cumbersome and subject
9See Bernanke (1986), Blanchard and Watson (1986), and Sims (1986) for contemporaneous
restrictions on the variance/covariance matrix. For long run restrictions, see Blanchard and Quah
(1989), Clarida and Gali (1994), and for sign restrictions, see Uhlig (2005), Mountford and Uhlig
(2009), Arias, Rubio-Ramirez, Waggoner, and Zha (2014).
10Pesaran (2004) suggests a generalized impulse response function, however it does not employ
and a priori economic theory, while Dees et al. (2007) and Chen et al. (2012) suggest a Cholesky
decomposition for each country, with an additional assumption that the United States economy
affects but does not contemporaneously respond to developments in other countries.
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to the same dimensionality issues of other identification methods. Fortunately, I am
only interested in a United States monetary policy shock while remaining agnostic
about the sources of any other innovations. As such, partial identification via sign
restrictions may overcome the issues associated with the high dimensionality of the
model.
Following Uhlig (2005), Mountford and Uhlig (2009), and Arias, Rubio-Ramirez,
Waggoner, and Zha (2018), I employ a combination of sign and zero restrictions to
identify a QE shock originating in the United States. To implement the sign restric-
tions, I first begin with the reduced-form GVAR model given in Equation 2.5
yt = c +
p∑
`=1
A`yt−` + ut, (2.8)
from which I can recover the structural form




























= Σu∗ = Ik. (2.13)
Identification of the structural model imposes sign restrictions on the elements of the
matrix A−10 , rather than A0. Uhlig’s (2005) algorithm partially identifies elements
of only one column of A0 to represent the responses of the model’s corresponding
variable to a shock of particular interest. The Bayesian approach to identification
with sign restrictions uses a non-informative inverted Normal-Wishart prior to avoid
potential bias from priors that are set too tightly to allow the data to speak for
itself. The posterior is generated via a Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method.
First, the orthogonal innovations of the VAR are extracted using a lower-triangular
Cholesky decomposition and the resulting impulse response functions are computed.11
A (k× 1) orthogonal impulse vector α is randomly drawn with replacement from the
unit sphere such that









is a matrix decomposition of Σu, and a is a k-dimensional unit vector. The vector α
is multiplied by the impulse responses computed from the Cholesky decomposition of
the residuals. If the structural impulse responses match the imposed sign restrictions,
11The Cholesky decomposition serves only as a method of orthogonalization and is not used to
identify shocks.
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Table 2.2: Identification of a Monetary Policy Shock
Variable Industrial Price Narrow Long Short Equity Exchange
Production Level Money Rate Rate Prices Rate
QE Shock Domestic
Impact 0 0
Sign + + − −
QE Shock Foreign
Impact 0 0 0
Sign +
the draw is kept. If not, the draw is discarded and the process repeats until the number
of accepted draws or maximum iterations is reached.
In the United States, QE is financed by the creation of excess reserves. Thus,
I simulate a QE shock by imposing a positive sign restriction on the narrow money
index, that I require to hold for a restriction horizon of six months. Because QE was
designed to prevent threats of deflation while maintaining the Fed’s inflation target,
I also impose a restriction that the price level not decrease for the duration of the six
month horizon. As expansionary monetary policy shocks lead to reductions in long
term interest rates and currency devaluation, I require that long term rates and the
exchange rate decrease.12 Finally, I impose zero contemporaneous impact restrictions
on the responses of industrial production and consumer prices, to reflect the delays
in the real economy to react to monetary policy surprises. The responses of the
other United States variables remain totally unconstrained. Finally, because output
and prices cannot immediately respond to a monetary policy surprise, I impose zero
contemporaneous impact restrictions on the responses of industrial production and
the price level.
12See Schenkelberg and Watzka (2013) and Weale and Wieladek (2016) for additional justification
of these restrictions.
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I place positive sign restrictions on the responses of the real exchange rate in
all foreign countries. A QE shock is a surprise for both output markets and foreign
central banks, therefore I place zero restrictions on output, the price level, and the
narrow monetary aggregate measure.13 All of the sign restrictions are imposed for
a period of six months.14 Table 2.2 presents the sign and zero restrictions for my
specification.
While this approach is simplified relative to full identification, it does not
rule out the existence of other orthogonal innovations with the same pattern as the
shock of interest. According to Fry and Pagan (2011) the “multiple models problem”
can imply ambiguity in proper identification of the shock of interest. Therefore, Fry
and Pagan (2011), Schenkelberg and Watzka (2013), and Weale and Wieladek (2016)
discuss the benefits of imposing additional sign restrictions to further ensure proper
identification of shocks as a means to address the multiple models problem. The
imposition of sign restrictions in a global framework requires additional restrictions
to distinguish between United States QE shocks, and other innovations of foreign
origin. I also impose additional sign restrictions as a robustness check. For statistical
inference, I present 1,000 successful draws of the MCMC process.15
13I vary the identifying restrictions as a robustness check, in which foreign yields are required to
decrease following a QE shock
14Uhlig (2005) and Schenkelberg and Watzka (2013) suggest a degree of arbitrariness in the se-
lection of the restriction horizon. I vary the restriction horizon using one, three, nine, and twelve
months as a robustness check.
15While convention in the sign restrictions literature is to report 1,000 successful MCMC draws, the
use of sign restrictions in a GVAR imposes a considerable computing cost with a much larger impact
multiplier matrix(B−10 ); Chudik and Fratzscher (2011), Georgiadis (2016), and Anaya, Hachula, and
Offermans (2016) report 500 successful draws.
57
2.3 Results
I report the individual responses of United States variables and the unweighted
averages of AEs and EMEs in Figure 2.3. I scale all responses to a 1% increase in
the United States narrow money index. Tables 2.3 and 2.4 present the maximum
individual responses of AE and EME countries. The impulse responses for the United
States are presented in Figure 5, AE responses for individual countries are presented
in Figures 6-12, and EME responses are in Figures 13-19 in the appendix.
2.3.1 Impulse Response Analysis
I find both United States industrial production and consumer prices increase
in response to a QE shock. The maximum values for industrial production and prices
are 1.25% and 2.25% deviations after impact. There are reductions in long term
yields by 2 basis points and short term yields by 1.25 basis points. A QE shock also
increases equity prices by 1.9%.16
Federal Reserve asset purchases appear to spill over to foreign economies
through interest and foreign exchange rates. Monetary policy expansion in the United
States is likely to be followed by lower long term rates in AEs and short term rates in
EMEs to maintain domestic stability, cut interest rate spreads, and reduce exchange
market appreciation pressures. The spillover of QE places upward pressure on the for-
eign currency. However, I find that both AEs and EMEs respond with expansionary
monetary policy of their own, as evidence by the downward pressure on yields.
Foreign monetary policy responses to a United States QE shock imply long
term yield reductions by 4.5 basis points in AEs and 2 basis points in EMEs. Long
term rates are likely to be influenced through QE spillovers as a result of freer cap-
16To compare my results to other works, Weale and Wieladek (2016) find a 0.58% increase in
output and a 0.62% increase in consumer prices.
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Figure 2.3: Median Impulse Responses: AEs, and EMEs
Note: The purple and blue impulse responses reported are unweighted averages of
medians of 1,000 successful MCMC draws for AEs and EMEs.
ital flows, which allow higher interconnection between global markets. These yield
reductions induce agents to find alternative investments in other markets, increasing
demand for bonds in EMEs, while lowering their respective yields. Thus, when the
United States aims to reduce domestic long term yields with QE, it is followed by
lower interest rates elsewhere. The negative responses in yields and positive responses
in monetary aggregates imply foreign central banks follow in kind with the Federal
Reserve’s monetary policy measures, thus offsetting negative spillover effects. These
foreign monetary responses lead to positive co-movements between United States
and foreign macro variables, consistent with a prosper-thy-neighbor effect after a QE
shock. My results are consistent with those of Bluedorn and Bowdler (2011), Ab-
delfaki and Feki (2012), Georgiadis (2016), and Anaya, Hachula, and Offermanns
(2016).
Exchange rate responses in EMEs to a United States QE shock are larger
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Table 2.3: Advanced Economy Maximum Responses
Industrial Consumer Narrow Long Short Equity Exchange
Production Prices Money Rate Rate Prices Rate
(% Dev.) (% Dev.) (% Dev.) (Bps) (Bps) (% Dev.) (% Dev.)
Australia 0.6 0.4 0.5 -4.0 -1.0 0.2 0.5
Canada 1.1 0.7 2.1 -5.0 -2.1 1.2 1.5
Denmark 3.0 1.8 2.1 -3.0 -5.0 1.4 1.0
Eurozone 0.7 1.0 0.8 -3.5 -3.0 0.9 2.8
Iceland 2.0 1.0 1.8 -1.5 -3.5 2.1 4.0
Israel 2.0 2.0 2.5 -2.8 -4.0 2.2 1.5
Japan 2.5 1.0 1.8 -6.0 -0.6 1.8 1.8
New Zealand 1.0 1.7 1.3 -4.5 -3.0 2.5 2.5
Norway 0.7 1.1 1.1 -5.9 -1.0 0.2 0.2
Sweden 0.3 1.3 0.2 -4.0 -1.0 0.2 0.2
Switzerland 0.4 0.4 0.8 -0.3 -0.3 0.4 0.4
U.K. 1.3 1.2 1.5 -0.6 -0.6 1.3 1.3
Note: The maximum responses reported in this table do all occur at the same time, and
thus averages from this table will differ from the unweighted mean of impulse responses in
Figure2.3.
than AEs. Referring to Tables 2.3 and 2.4, I find AE exchange rate increases are
the largest in the Euro Area, Japan, and the United Kingdom, all with increases
above 1%, with remaining AE exchange rates increasing by less than 1%. The largest
EME responses are experienced by Hungary (7.3%), Poland (5.0%), Mexico (4.0%),
Colombia (3.8%), and Brazil (3.8%). The average maximum exchange rate response
after impact in Figure 2.3 is 3% in EMEs and 1% in AEs. This increase in the
exchange rate generates risks of capital flight, compelling EMEs to engage in more
aggressive monetary policy measures than AEs. The average maximum response of
narrow money is 1.5% in EMEs and 1.2% in AEs. Table 2.4 indicates the largest
EME narrow money responses for individual countries are in Hungary (2.6%), Chile
(2.1%), China (2.0%), Turkey (1.8%), Poland (1.5%), Colombia (1.3%), and Brazil
(1.2%). Narrow money responses AEs in Table 2.3 are the largest in Israel (2.5%),
Canada (2.1%), Denmark (2.1%), Iceland (1.78%), and Japan (1.8%).
Monetary expansion in both AEs and EMEs lead to an increase in the price
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Table 2.4: Emerging Market Economy Maximum Responses
Industrial Consumer Narrow Long Short Equity Exchange
Production Prices Money Rate Rate Prices Rate
(% Dev.) (% Dev.) (% Dev.) (Bps) (Bps) (% Dev.) (% Dev.)
Brazil 1.4 1.6 1.2 -5.0 -13.0 1.8 3.8
Chile 1.3 2.0 2.1 -1.3 -16.0 0.9 3.1
China 1.0 0.8 0.9 -5.7 -7.0 0.4 1.5
Colombia 1.0 1.3 1.4 -14.0 -6.7 2.8 3.8
Czech Rep. 0.2 0.1 0.2 -3.0 -1.0 0.2 2.5
Hungary 1.0 0.3 2.6 -5.0 -24.0 2.0 7.3
India 1.0 1.0 0.6 -7.0 -10.0 0.4 2.1
Mexico 1.2 1.8 1.1 -1.1 -7.5 0.6 4.0
Poland 1.2 1.1 1.5 -3.5 -5.0 0.5 5.0
Russia 0.2 0.1 0.2 -1.1 -2.5 0.3 1.1
South Korea 0.3 0.3 0.3 -0.5 -0.3 0.2 1.6
Turkey 1.4 2.0 1.8 -13.0 -18 0.8 2.2
Note: The maximum responses reported in this table do all occur at the same time, and
thus averages from this table will differ from the unweighted mean of impulse responses in
Figure2.3.
level, however the lagged response is induced by construction of the identifying re-
strictions. As AEs are more likely to have monetary policy rules than EMEs, policy
responses by AEs are less aggressive. The maximum average impact of consumer
prices is 1% in AEs and 1.75% in EMEs. These results are consistent with Chudik
and Fratzscher (2011), who find larger responses in consumer prices in EMEs. The
average responses of industrial production in Figure 2.3 are larger in AEs than EMEs.
AEs experience a 1.6% increase in production while EME output increases by 1%.
These findings are also consistent with Chudik and Fratzscher (2011). Table 2.3 in-
dicates the largest output responses for AEs are in Denmark (3.0%), Japan (2.5%),
Israel (2.0%), Iceland (2.0%), and the United Kingdom (1.3%).
The EMEs in Table 2.4 with the largest consumer price responses to a QE
shock are Chile (2.0%), Turkey (2.0%), Mexico (1.8%), Brazil (1.6%), and Colombia
(1.3%), and China (0.8%). Each of these economies have increases in industrial
production above 1%.
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2.3.2 The Role of Foreign Economic Characteristics in Mon-
etary Policy Responses to QE
I regroup the economies by characteristics of their monetary authority regimes.
I present and discuss the results of country groupings by inflation targeting and foreign
exchange rate regimes. I report the unweighted averages in all of my impulse response
functions in this subsection.
2.3.2.1 Inflation Targeting Regimes
First, I group economies by central banks with inflation targeting or other
monetary aggregate rules. Economies with inflation targeting regimes can provide a
more preferable habitat for investors. If an economy’s central bank announces and
maintains a credible commitment to an inflation target, then investment in that econ-
omy will be more attractive than in non-inflation targeting regimes. The countries in
my sample are explicit inflation targeters; Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colom-
bia, the Czech Republic, the Eurozone, Israel, India, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand,
Norway, Poland, Turkey, Russia, South Korea, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
All other countries are treated as non-targeters. I refer to the IMF classification of
inflation targeting regimes for my sample grouping.
Figure 2.4 presents the impulse responses for regimes separated by inflation
targeting policies. The monetary policy responses of inflation targeting banks is
significantly less pronounced than non targeters. Long term yields decrease by 6
basis points for inflation targeting banks and 2 basis points in non targeting regimes.
Short term yields fall by 4 basis points for inflation targeters, and 7 basis points
for non targeters. Narrow money increases by 0.4% for inflation targeters and 1.4%
for non targeters. Following the monetary policy response, consumer prices increase
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Figure 2.4: Inflation Targeting Regimes
Note: The dark purple and orange impulse responses reported are unweighted averages of
medians of 1,000 successful MCMC draws for AEs and EMEs.
by 1% in targeting countries, and 1.8% for non targeting countries. As inflation
targeting economies generate more stable monetary policy responses, less uncertainty
is generated regarding the perceived volatility in prices. This induces investors to
alter their asset holdings in favor of inflation targeting economies, leading to larger
responses in equity prices. Furthermore, industrial production increases by 1.1% in
economies with an inflation target, whereas economies with no inflation targeting
policy experience an increase in industrial production of 0.6%.
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2.3.2.2 Exchange Rate Regimes
I consider exchange rate characteristics of each economy, motivated by the
Mundell-Fleming “trilemma”. If countries let their currency freely float, the trilemma
suggests they could have independence from United States monetary policy, shield-
ing themselves against undesirable policy spillovers from QE. Klein and Shambaugh
(2015) and Aizenman et al. (2016) provide evidence for this trilemma, however Rey
(2013) argues in favor of a dilemma, in which a floating exchange rate regime is not
enough to buffer foreign economies against QE shocks.
I separate economies according to their exchange rate policies. I use two
groups; floaters and peggers. Ideally, I would separate the sample economies as either
floaters or peggers by their stated policy preferences, but the list of de jure and de
facto exchange rate regimes is not always similar. Additionally, most of the countries
in my sample are considered to be de jure floaters. I refer to the IMF classification
of de facto exchange rate regimes for my sample grouping.
The floating economies are Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia , Euro-
zone, Hungary, Iceland, India, Israel, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Poland,
South Korea, Sweden, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. The peggers are China,
the Czech Republic, Denmark, and Switzerland. The list of peggers is composed of
primarily soft peggers, however Denmark has a conventional peg.
Figure 2.5 presents the results for the floating and pegged exchange rate
groups. The real exchange rate responses give validity to the theoretical predic-
tions that monetary policy spillovers generate stronger appreciation pressures on the
exchange rate in floating exchange rate regimes. The response of the real exchange
rate is 3% in free floating regimes and 1.4% in pegged exchange rate regimes; results
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Figure 2.5: Median Impulse Responses for Floating and Non-Floating Exchange Rate
Regimes
Note: The purple and blue impulse responses reported are unweighted averages of
medians of 1,000 successful MCMC draws for AEs and EMEs.
that are qualitatively consistent with Hoffmann (2007) and Georgiadis (2016).17
While economies with floating exchange rate regimes should enjoy monetary
policy independence from the Federal Reserve, I find they still respond in kind fol-
lowing a QE shock. Floating exchange rate economies experience less mirroring in
bond yields than managed exchange rate regimes, however their monetary policy re-
sponses are not statistically insignificant, as would be expected if they had complete
monetary autonomy. Free floating economies have reductions in long term yields by
2 basis points and short term yields by 4 basis points. In contrast, peggers have long
term yield reductions by 6 basis points for long term yields, and 7 basis points for
short term yield. Additionally, the maximum impacts in narrow money for floating
exchange rate regimes is 0.7%, compared to 0.95% for peggers.
Similar to the inflation targeting economies, central banks that adopt floating
17This reflects the fact that Denmark is the only economy with a conventional peg in the sample.
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exchange rate policies generally respond less aggressively than those with pegged ex-
change rates. Economies that can credibly commit to maintaining a floating exchange
rate can guarantee less volatility in the monetary responses to spillovers from foreign
markets. While the exchange rate increases by nearly double that of the pegged
exchange rate economies, equity prices increase by 0.3% more, and industrial produc-
tion increases by 1.1% for floaters and 0.6% for peggers. Consumer prices increase
by 0.75% for free floaters and 1.1% for managed exchange rate regimes. While I find
that economies with free floating exchange rates respond less aggressively than those
with pegged exchange rates, my results support the conclusions of Anaya, Hachula,
and Offermanns (2016), Passari and Rey (2015), and Rey (2016), who find that a
floating exchange rate regime is not sufficient to insulate foreign economies from an
unconventional monetary policy shock.
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2.3.3 Forecast Error Variance Decomposition
I present the results of the forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD)
to investigate the relative contribution of a United States unconventional monetary
policy shock to foreign variables. Figure 2.6 presents the FEVDs for the United States
and the unweighted averages of the FEVDs for AEs and EMEs. Figures 2.7 and 2.8
present the unweighted averages of the FEVDs for AEs and EMEs. Individual FEVD
plots are presented in Appendix B.2.
The United States FEVDs in Figure 2.6 indicate that a QE shock explains 12%
of the variance in industrial production, and 12.5% in consumer prices. Furthermore,
a QE shock appears to contribute roughly 35% of the explained variance in long term
yield upon impact, and 16% for short term yield. This provides more evidence of QE
operating through long term yield in the United States. Furthermore, a QE shock
explains nearly 12% of the variance in equity prices, and 8% for the real exchange
rate.
Figure 2.6 suggests a QE shock contributes substantially more to United States
industrial production and consumer prices, while providing little to the explained
variance in these variables in foreign economies. A QE shock contributes more to AE
output (6.2%) than for EMEs (4%), however the reverse holds for consumer prices.
A QE shock contributes 5.2% of the explained variance for AEs in consumer prices
and 7.5% for EMEs. This lends additional support for the conclusions of Chen et
al. (2012) and Barroso et al. (2015), who find EMEs respond with larger increases
in prices than AEs. This is especially true for Latin American economies, who have
some of the largest shares of the variance in prices explained by a QE shock.
Despite the small contributions of QE to industrial production and prices in
foreign economies, it is perhaps evident of effective foreign monetary policy responses
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Figure 2.6: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition
Note: The purple and blue FEVDs are unweighted averages of AEs and EMEs.
to QE. The most substantial contributions of a QE shock in foreign economies are
generated through interest rates, equity prices, and the real exchange rate. After
impact, 25% of long term yield variance in AEs is explained by QE. In addition,
11.5% of equity price variance in AEs is explained by QE.18 QE appears to explain
more variance in short term yields in EMEs (16%) than AEs (13.5%). Thus, a QE
shock propagates through different interest rate transmission mechanisms in AEs than
in EMEs. These findings are supported by those of Chudik and Fratzscher (2011).
Furthermore, a QE shock contributes 10.5% of the explained variance in the real
exchange rate for AEs, and 12.7% in EMEs.
I also discuss the FEVDs for inflation targeting and floating exchange rate
regimes. Figure 2.7 presents the FEVDs for groupings based on inflation targeting
policy and Figure 2.8 presents the FEVDs for floating and pegged exchange rate
18See Vayanos and Vila (2009) and Weale and Wieladek (2016).
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Figure 2.7: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition: Inflation Targeting Regime
Note: The orange and purple FEVDs are unweighted averages of inflation targeters and
non-inflation targerters.
regimes. A QE shock contributes more to inflation targeting regimes through ex-
change rates, yields, equity prices, output, and consumer prices. However, narrow
money measures of non inflation targeting economies experience a larger contribution
of QE than targeters.
The FEVDs for floating and pegged exchange rate regimes imply a QE shock
from the United States explains more variance in narrow money, consumer prices,
and long term yields in pegging economies. As UMP spillovers generate pressure on
exchange rates, foreign central banks engage in more substantial policy responses,
thereby reducing yield while increasing narrow money and consumer prices. The
shares of the variance in exchange rates, equity prices, and industrial production,
however, are larger for floating exchange rate economies. As foreign banks with
floating exchange rate policies respond less to monetary policy spillovers than peggers,
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Figure 2.8: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition: Exchange Rate Regime
Note: The pink and dark blue FEVDs are unweighted averages of floating and pegging
exchange rate regimes.
it is not surprising that a QE shock explains more variation in floating exchange rate
economies.
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2.3.4 The Transmission Mechanism of Monetary Policy
I discuss the implications of my results with respect to the transmission mech-
anisms through which QE may have operated in both the United States and foreign
economies. I test for interest rate and exchange rate channels, with emphasis on the
presence of the portfolio rebalance channel, which is argued to have been activated
as a response to UMP measures.19
The results for the United States imply activation of the portfolio rebalance
channel. The reduction in long term yields by 2 basis points in the United States
coupled with a maximum response of equity prices by 1% are consistent with the
literature, namely Weale and Wieladek (2016). The FEVDs provide additional evi-
dence in favor of the activation of this channel in the United States, in that 35% of
the variance in long term rates, and nearly 12% of the variance in equity prices is
explained by a QE shock.
In AEs, a large reduction in long term government bond yields by 4.5 basis
points coupled with an increase in equity prices by 1.9% provide evidence of portfolio
rebalancing channel activation. This is further supported by the FEVDs, in which
25% of the variance in long term yields and 11.5% of the variance in equity prices
are explained by a QE shock. I conclude there is an activation of this transmission
mechanism for all AEs in my sample with the exceptions of Sweden and Switzerland,
who appear to respond more through short term than long term yields. My results
regarding activation of the portfolio rebalance channel in foreign economies support
the findings of D’Amico and King (2010), Gagnon et al. (2012), and Hamilton and
Wu (2012), who conclude it serves as a significant mechanism through which QE
affects cross-border capital flows.
19See Weale and Wieladek (2016) and Vayanos and Vila (2009).
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Evidence for this channel is less definitive in EMEs, which appear to respond
more through short term yield with smaller increases in equity prices. EMEs experi-
ence an 8.1 basis point reduction in short term yield, in which 16% of the variance
can be explained by a QE shock. A few notable exceptions, however, are Colom-
bia, Poland, and Russia, where long term rates are more responsive following United
States QE implementation.
The responses of AEs and EMEs, as indicated previously, imply operation
through exchange rate channels. The maximum average responses of AEs in Figure
2.3 are 1% for AEs and 3% for EMEs. Figure 2.6 indicates QE contributes 10.5% of
the explained variance in exchange rates for AEs and 12.7% in AEs. Unsurprisingly,
there is especially strong evidence to imply activations of this channel are stronger in
floating exchange rate economies.
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2.3.5 Robustness Checks
I perform multiple robustness checks in this section. The checks discussed
in this paper include varying trade weights to confirm the presence of an indirect
trade channel operating in my analysis, estimating my GVAR using a pre-financial
crisis period of January 2000 to December 2006, running an alternative identification
scheme, and finally, estimation with variations in the horizons for which the sign
restrictions hold. All of these checks confirm the robustness of my GVAR model to
various alterations in the specification.
2.3.5.1 Pre-Crisis Trade Weights
To assess the impacts of a direct or indirect trade channel, I use an alternative
trade flow weight matrix for the reduced form GVAR estimation with trade weights
averaged over the sample period 2000-2008. This sample period is included because it
covers a period during which the Eurozone was on the Euro as their currency. Similar
to the approach by Cesa-Bianchi, Pesaran, Rebucci, and Xu (2012), the inclusion of
this sample period allows me to ensure the quantitative and qualitative results are
robust to different trade weights.
Figure 2.9 presents the impulse responses of the GVAR with different trade
weights. The individual impulse responses for this exercise are contained in Appendix
B.3. The similarity of the responses with different trade weights suggest there are no
substantially different results when altering the weighting schemes. Consistent with
Cesa-Bianchi, Pesaran, Rebucci, and Xu (2012), this implies the presence of indirect
trade channel operations. Therefore, my results are not driven by any form of trade
agreements/flows. My results run counter to the claims by Lavigne et al. (2014), who
argues that QE spillovers transmit through trade channels to fuel economic recovery
73
Figure 2.9: Median Impulse Responses with Pre-Crisis Trade Weights
Note: The purple and blue impulse responses reported are unweighted averages of
medians of 1,000 successful MCMC draws for AEs and EMEs.
in EMEs. Thus, it is not likely QE operates through direct trade channels.
2.3.5.2 Pre-Crisis Sample Period
I use a sample period of the pre-financial crisis as a second robustness check,
beginning in January 2000 and terminating in December 2006. The pre- and post-
crisis periods are compared in Figure 2.10. The individual impulse responses are
presented in Appendix B.4.
The qualitative responses for both pre- and post-crisis sample periods are
similar, however the magnitudes differ substantially. The responses for the pre-crisis
sample period are dampened relative to the post-crisis period, which is consistent
with the existing literature. Importantly, I conclude the results for the variables in
my specification are insensitive to changes in the sample period.
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Figure 2.10: Median Impulse Responses with Pre-Crisis Period
Note: The purple and blue impulse responses reported are unweighted averages of
medians of 1,000 successful MCMC draws for AEs and EMEs.
2.3.5.3 Variations in the Identifying Restrictions
To address the possibility of the “multiple models problem” discussed by Fry
and Pagan (2011), I impose two different sets of sign restrictions to identify a United
States QE shock and its spillovers abroad. It is common in the literature to impose
additional sign restrictions beyond the shock of interest.20
In the first set of alternative sign restrictions, as performed by Weale and
Wieladek (2016), I impose a negative sign restriction on the response of United States
long and short term yields. I also restrict the response of equity prices in the United
States to be positive. For the sign restrictions in foreign countries, I require narrow
money increase after a United States QE shock. In light of the justifications from
Alpanda and Kabaca (2015) on the responses of long term interest rates, I require
20See Weale and Wieladek (2016) and Schenkelberg and Watzka (2013) for the imposition of
additional sign restrictions to further identify the shocks of particular interest in the analysis.
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Table 2.5: Alternative Identification of a Monetary Policy Shock
Variable Industrial Price Reserve Long Short Equity Exchange
Production Level Balances Rate Rate Prices Rate
QE Shock Domestic I
Impact 0 0
Sign + + + − + −
QE Shock Foreign I
Impact 0 0 0
Sign − +
QE Shock Domestic II
Impact 0 0
Sign + + + − − + −
QE Shock Foreign II
Impact 0 0 0
Sign
long term yields decrease. The additional restrictions imposed are presented as “QE
Shock Domestic I” and “QE Shock Foreign I” in Table 2.5.21
As a second set of alternative identification, I impose fewer restrictions in the
foreign responses to a QE shock, similar to those performed by Chudik and Fratzscher
(2011) and Anaya, Hachula, and Offermans (2016). I only place zero restrictions on
the responses of industrial production, consumer prices, and narrow money, and all
other foreign variables remain totally unconstrained. This identification scheme can
provide additional evidence regarding the transmission mechanism of QE abroad.
By leaving exchange and interest rates unconstrained in the foreign responses, any
significant movements in either variable will further support conclusions regarding
activation of these channels in QE spillovers. A summary of the sign and zero restric-
tions is provided in Table 2.5 under “QE Shock Domestic II” and “QE Shock Foreign
II”.
21Note that I do not alter the restriction horizon in this particular exercise; the sign restrictions
are still imposed for a period of six months.
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Figure 2.11: Impulse Responses: Alternative Identification Scheme I
Note: The purple and blue impulse responses reported are unweighted averages of
medians of 1,000 successful MCMC draws for AEs and EMEs.
Figure 2.11 presents the unweighted averages of the impulse responses for AEs
and EMEs. There are no qualitative differences between the results generated from
this identification scheme relative to the baseline model discussed in the main part
of this paper, however a number of noteworthy quantitative differences occur. All of
the bond yield responses in both AEs and EMEs are significant. For reference, ten of
the AEs and eight of the EMEs showed significance in yield reduction in the original
identification scheme.
Despite the slight differences in the number of significant impulse responses
under the alternative identification strategy, the evidence still suggests activation
of long term interest rate and portfolio rebalance channels in AEs and short term
interest rate channels in EMEs. AEs experience an average maximum reduction in
long rates by 3 basis points in the alternative identification scheme, compared to 2
basis points with the original sign restrictions. Short rates in AEs are reduced by
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Figure 2.12: Impulse Responses: Alternative Identification Scheme II
Note: The purple and blue impulse responses reported are unweighted averages of
medians of 1,000 successful MCMC draws for AEs and EMEs.
a maximum of 2.1 basis points with the original sign restrictions, and 0.5 with the
additional restrictions imposed. Long rates in EMEs originally fall by 5 basis points
under the original identification, and 1.85 basis points with the alternative set of
sign restrictions. Short term yields decrease by 9.2 basis points under the original
identification method, and drop by 5 basis points with the additional sign restrictions.
Thus, while there are some differences in the magnitudes of the reductions in yield in
both AEs and EMEs, the channels of monetary policy remain unaffected.
Additionally, I note a larger response in narrow money in EMEs under the
alternative identification scheme, with somewhat smaller responses in consumer prices
for both AEs and EMEs. Despite these differences, the responses still suggest that
AEs experience larger responses in industrial production than EMEs, and EMEs
experience larger responses through consumer prices.
The results of the second identification scheme are presented in Figure 2.12.
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The results are qualitatively similar to the baseline and first alternative identification
schemes. The responses of the magnitudes of the exchange rate and short/long term
interest rates are similar to the previous identification schemes. QE still appears to
spill over to foreign economies through exchange and interest rate channels.
2.3.5.4 Variation in the Restriction Horizon
As a final robustness check, I vary the horizon that the sign restriction hold
after impact. As discussed by Uhlig (2005), it is difficult to select an appropriate
restriction horizon, thus leading to a degree of arbitrariness in the selection of this
particular parameter in the estimation procedure.22 I estimate my GVAR with the
sign restrictions holding for one, three, nine, and twelve months. Reassuringly, my
results are qualitatively insensitive to changes in the restriction horizon.
Quantitatively, difference do not arise until I reach the nine and twelve month
restriction horizons. I note that the responses longer restriction horizons imply more
significant responses in yields for both AEs and EMEs. The impulse responses in
Appendices B.6.5-B.6.8 show significant yield reductions in every economy in my
sample. Additionally, the responses of narrow money are much more significant and
pronounced than under the original restriction horizon.
Another noteworthy difference arises in the responses of industrial production.
The response of industrial production is much larger under the longer restriction hori-
zon. Many economies have responses larger than 1% with the nine month restriction
horizon. Despite these quantitative differences, the overall results of my paper and
the transmission mechanisms of QE in foreign economies remain unchanged; AEs
respond through long term yield, and EMEs respond through short term yield.
22Schenkelberg and Watzka (2013) estimate numerous sign restricted impulse responses in their
VAR as a sensitivity test involving variations in the restriction horizon.
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2.4 Conclusion
The main objective of this paper is to assess foreign central bank responses to
a United States QE shock. I use a GVAR with sign and zero restrictions to identify
a QE shock without imposing restrictions on real activity, interest rates, or exchange
rates. The advantage of using a GVAR to model international spillover effects is that
I can consistently estimate spillovers that capture third party spillovers and feedbacks
that would not be possible using a bilateral VAR instead. By using sign and zero
restrictions, it is possible to avoid imposing an implausible number of restrictions to
ensure identification of a GVAR.
My results, which are shown to be robust to various alterations in the spec-
ification and identification setup, indicate that a United States QE shock generates
spillovers through exchange rate and interest rate channels, with activation of long
term yield channels in AEs and short term yield channels EMEs. Foreign central
banks respond to a QE shock through implementation of their own expansionary
monetary policy measures, however EMEs respond more aggressively to offset neg-
ative spillover effects. The responses in industrial production and prices imply AEs
respond more through increases in output, while EMEs respond with higher prices.
Ultimately, I find that QE generates positive spillover effects in both AEs and EMEs,
with some of the largest EME responses in output in Latin America and Turkey.
These results support the existing literature.
I group central banks by inflation targeting and exchange rate regimes. In-
flation targeters respond with less pronounced policy measures and experience more
stable responses than non-inflation targeting banks. Floating exchange rate economies
also respond with less aggressive monetary policy measures to offset potential spillover
effects of a QE shock. My results for the exchange rate regime grouping support the
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findings of Anaya, Hachula, and Offermanns (2016), Passari and Rey (2015), and Rey
(2016) that a flexible exchange rate regime may not be enough to adequately buffer
economies against monetary policy spillovers from other countries.
In addition, I shed light on the transmission mechanisms of monetary policy,
with activation of exchange rate and interest rate channels in both advanced and
emerging market economies. A notable difference, however, is that AEs appear to
experience policy activation through long term yields coupled with increases in equity
prices, indicating activation of the portfolio rebalance channel. EMEs, on the other
hand, appear to operate through short term interest rate channels.
Given the limited availability of data in the GVAR I estimate, a more detailed
assessment of the particular transmission mechanisms at work in foreign economies
following an unconventional monetary policy shock from the United States is diffi-
cult. Other channels may be activated through mitigations of perceived risk, and
announcements of monetary policy regarding the expected future path of short term
interest rates managed through forward guidance.23 Given issues with availability of
relevant data in the countries in my sample, tests for this channel are not possible.
A further investigation of this issue, with more focus on this mechanism of monetary
transmission is left for future research.
23Bauer and Rudebush (2014) argue the presence of the signaling channel of monetary policy, in
which asset purchase announcements send a clear signal to investors regarding the central bank’s
intentions to keep short term interest rates low for longer than previously anticipated.
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Black and White Schooling
Differentials: An Empirical
Investigation of the Value of Equal
Education Opportunities
3.1 Introduction
For more than two centuries, African Americans faced substantial levels of
discrimination with whites. Jim Crow laws, which were enacted between the late
19th and early 20th centuries, forced racial segregation between whites and blacks in
all public facilities in various (mostly Southern) states across the country. Despite
being challenged in 1896 in Plessy vs. Ferguson, the Supreme Court upheld the laws
as constitutional, conditional on a “separate but equal” doctrine for facilities used by
African Americans. Despite the Court’s mandate regarding equitable conditions for
both races, this ruling was not followed, especially with regard to public education.
During the period of 1890 to 1960, state level per pupil expenditures for black stu-
dents were 67% of white students. In 1954, the Brown vs. the Board of Education
Supreme Court decision ruled that Jim Crow laws were unconstitutional, thus man-
dating the removal of segregation policies in the entire United States Not all states
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were cooperative in removing them, given the vague time frame during the Court’s
ruling. It was not until the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of
1965 that these laws were entirely abolished from state legislatures across the country.
However, despite the integration of whites and blacks in public facilities, guarantee-
ing an equal access to education among all races in the United States, the policies
enacted under Jim Crow can have lasting implications regarding the economic and
educational status of African Americans relative to their white cohorts into future
generations.
Figure 3.1 presents the average of log real expenditures per-pupil for white
and black students in 17 states that had segregation policies in the United States
between 1890 and 1960. The data suggest that black students were allocated as little
as 41% of white student funding in 1930, and 51% by 1940. This disparity in state-
level allocations of funding for white and black students persisted well into the 1960’s,
when segregationist policies were eradicated from the United States. Yet despite the
efforts of federal and state governments to integrate schools and bring an end to
the Segregation era in the United States, the effects of these differences in funding
carried persistent consequences regarding substantial disparities in enrollment and
graduation rates between whites and blacks.
With major differentials even in educational outcomes of blacks relative to
whites in the present day, it is of key importance to investigate the potential mech-
anisms through which Segregation era policies affected black families and prevented
them from catching up to their white age cohort. Figure 3.2 presents the high school
graduation rates of white and black students in the United States between 1972 and
2012. The data show a striking differential among the educational attainment be-
tween whites and blacks, although the gap in graduation rates has been closing in
recent years. However, the graduation rate for blacks 7 years after Segregation was
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Figure 3.1: White and Black Log Real Expenditures Per Pupil: 1890-1960
finally abolished was 72.5%, while for whites, it was 87%. However, by 1991, when
white high school graduation rates crossed the 90% mark, blacks were vastly behind,
with a graduation rate of 83%, and it took over two decades for their graduation rates
to catch up to the white levels from 1991.
These data provide a motivation for the investigation into the differences be-
tween white and black education, namely the unequal access to education during the
Segregation era in the southern United States. To provide a theoretical explanation
for the differentials in access to schooling, the mechanisms through which they prop-
agated, and the ultimate ramifications of Segregation era policies, Tamura, Simon,
and Murphy (2016) develop a theoretical framework that documents, explains, and
computes the welfare costs of discrimination in black schooling between 1820 and
2000. The model uses a dynamic, dynastic framework of fertility and school choice
with quantity and quality dimensions (Becker, Murphy, and Tamura; 1990, Murphy,
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Figure 3.2: White and Black High School Graduation Rates: 1972-2012
Simon, and Tamura; 2008, and Tamura, Simon, and Murphy; 2016). The theoreti-
cal framework provides a measure of the price of schooling by race as a parameter
outside the model, and shows the consequences and welfare costs beteen whites and
blacks. A key feature of the model is that it allows human capital to accumulate from
one generation to the next, and is used to produce the following generation’s human
capital stock. Because parents’ human capital stock is used to produce the next gen-
eration’s human capital, families with lower parental human capital are less efficient
in producing child human capital (Tamura, Simon, and Murphy; 2016). Therefore,
despite the removal of discriminatory barriers to equal access to education, the policy
ramifications can persist for decades after.
Our paper presents a newly constructed data set on black and white school-
ing expenditures per pupil for 16 states that operated under segregation between
the years 1890 and 1960. The data were gathered by accessing state archival data
and Margo’s Race and Schooling in the South, 1880-1950: An Economic History.
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Through the introduction of this novel data set, we can empirically test the values of
key educational efficiency parameters generated in the model presented by Tamura,
Simon, and Murphy (2016). We find statistically significant results in favor of the
predicted values of the model.1
The results of this paper present a number of important policy implications.
First, the model generated values appear to fit closely with the data, providing empir-
ical support that black students faced higher schooling costs than their white student
counterparts. Second, as the model presented by Tamura, Simon, and Murphy (2016)
includes a law of motion for human capital spillovers across generations within house-
holds, the removal of discriminatory barriers in the 1960’s do not provide immediate
educational equity across white and African Americans, however parameters within
the model allow for convergence in these variables over time, as can be evidenced by
the data regarding high school graduation rates between both races. These policy
implications suggest that because blacks were consistently discriminated against for
nearly two centuries, requiring more time to equalize human capital than it does to
achieve convergence in the price and years of schooling.
The rest of this paper is as follows: Section 3.2 provides a discussion of the
theoretical model employed in this paper, as well as an explanation of the key pa-
rameters of interest in the model. Section 3.3 presents the data construction used
to empirically test the model, Section 3.4 provides the results of the empirical tests
of the model, Section 3.5 provides a number of robustness checks, and Section 3.6
concludes.
1Earnings data for 1890 to 1930 were not available. Therefore, to accurately fit time series data
to values parametrized within the model, we first construct an estimate of average earnings for both
whites and blacks by state and year for the years 1890-1930 using earnings data from 1940. We fit
the model using decadal data for 16 of the 18 states that engaged in segregation during the time
period in our sample (Data for Kentucky and West Virginia were not available for the sample period
of interest).
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3.2 Generating a Measure of Efficiency of School-
ing
Unequal access to schooling was arguably the most important manifestation
of racial discrimination against blacks in the US after the end of slavery (Margo;
1990, Canaday and Tamura; 2009). Tamura, Simon, and Murphy (2016) develop
a dynamic, dynastic human capital accumulation model to provide a theory-based
quantitative measure of the cost to educate a child. The model fits the differential
schooling attainment of blacks, arising from differential fertility and discriminatory
education provision.
3.2.1 Model Discussion
The model by Tamura, Simon, and Murphy (2016) matches time series of
fertility and years of schooling to produce expenditures per pupil for white and black
students via the cost of schooling. We first provide a brief discussion of the setup of
the model and then discuss the derivation of the key parameters used in describing
the unequal access to schooling among black and white students during Segregation
in the United States.
3.2.1.1 Preferences
A parent of race R belonging to cohort t and living in state i chooses con-
sumption ci,R,t, gross fertility xi,R,t, living space per child Si,R,t, and human capital








[(1− δi,R,t)xi,R,t − a]1−ϕ + Λhϕi,R.t+1
1− βi,R,tδνiRti,R,t
[(1− δi,R,t)xi,R,t − a] (1− δi,R,t)

(3.1)
where δi,R,t is young adult mortality, and in order to place a lower bound on fertil-
ity, the model imposes a restriction that a ≥ 0. Ideally, one would assume that all
individuals have identical preferences, regardless of race or state residence. The pref-
erence parameters (α, ψ, ϕ, a,Λ) are identical across race, state, or birth cohort. Two
of these parameters (a,Λ) are fixed by the other taste and technological parameters,
and stationary solution values of schooling and fertility.2
The fertility and human capital investment decision is similar to the one in
Jones (2001), in which declining mortality induces a demographic transition. Higher
human capital investment (hi,R,t+1) raises parental utility, but is assumed to increase
the disutility of child mortality. The precautionary demand for children reflected by
β and νi,R,t is similar to Kalemli-Ozcan (2002, 2003) and Tamura (2006). Higher mor-
tality δi,R,t reduces utility both directly, in the final term, and indirectly by reducing
net fertility below the gross fertility xi,R,t. Declining mortality reduces gross fertility,
and in the limit, the final term disappears as mortality approaches zero. Thus, blacks
and whites have similar preferences in the limit. The parameter τ̄i,R,t is average time
spent in school by the children born to parents of generation t, and is an external
effect of schooling that no parent internalizes. The parameter ρt determines the dif-
fusion of human capital spillovers from one generation to the next, and generates the
convergence of human capital levels seen in the data. The model further requires that
ρt ≥ 0, which implies that as long as schooling in the state is positive, children can
take some advantage of the state of the art human capital in existence. The more
education society provides on average to its children, the more it can benefit from
2For a more detailed exposition of the model, see Tamura, Simon, and Murphy (2016).
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learning as opposed to innovating and discovering by itself.
3.2.2 Technology of Human Capital Accumulation
















Parents choose the amount of time to devote to educating their child, τi,R,t, which is
identified with years of schooling. The productivity of this time is positively related
to the unobserved existing stock of their human capital, hi,R,t, and the unobserved
frontier level of human capital in the economy, h̄t. The term h̄t introduces a human
capital spillover. Parents are assumed to have perfect foresight regarding the effect
of τ̄i,R,t on ρi,R,t, but ignore the effect of their choice on τi,R,t on τ̄i,R,t, ρi,R,t, and h̄t.
Tamura (2006) assigns each period a life 40 years, thus 40τt is equal to the
average number of years of schooling observed for a representative member of the birth
cohort t+ 1, born to parents of generation t. To illustrate this particular mechanism,
suppose there are identical durations of schooling equal to 12 years in two states




= 0.30, ρt = 0.3934, 1 − ρt = 0.6066, The ratio of human capital in the two










As income is proportional to human capital, this implies a rate of income
convergence of 1 − 0.60660.025 = 1.24% per year. At 15.25 years of schooling, τt =
0.38125, ρt=0.50, and convergence is 1.7% per year. Finally, at 8 years of schooling,
τt=0.20, ρt=0.2623, and convergence is only 0.76% per year. A maximum value of ρt
of 0.50 is consistent with the rate of income convergence of 1-2% per year observed
in the data.3
3.2.2.1 The Parental Budget Constraint
The parent’s budget constraint requires that total consumption be
equal to income. The budget constraint is given by
pci,R,t + ri,R,txi,R,tSi,R,t = hi,R,t [1− xi,R,t (θ + κi,R,tτi,R,t)] , (3.5)
where p is the price of consumption, child rearing takes a fixed proportion of time
per child, θ, and ri,R,t is the unit price of living space per child Si,R,t, included to
capture the Baby Boom. Parents divide their time between the labor market and
raising children.
3.2.2.2 Efficiency of Teaching Time: κt
Unequal access to schooling is an important manifestation of racial discrimi-
nation against blacks in the United States after the abolition of slavery at the end
of the Civil War (Margo; 1990, and Canaday and Tamura; 2009).4 An assumption
3The parametric form given and the magnitudes chosen for ρt are largely consistent with the
literature on the intergenerational elasticity of earnings between parents and their children. The
upper rate of convergence, 1.7% per year, is consistent with the evidence contained in Tamura
(1996, 2001), and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991 and 1992).
4Heckman and Payner (1989) and Holzner and Ihlanfeldt (1998) show discrimination in the labor
market, and Collins and Margo (2000, 2001, and 2003) present evidence for discrimination in the
housing market.
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contained within the model is that unequal access to schooling is manifested through
the parameter κt, which governs the (in)efficiency of schooling time. As the total cost
of schooling one’s child is κtτt, higher values of κt require greater diversion of time
away from the labor market to produce a given level of human capital investment in
children.
For ease of notation in this subsection, and given that decisions made on the
margin are invariant to state and race, we drop the i and R subscripts in the discussion
of the generation of κtτt in the model for this particular subsection. If we let Et be
total expenditures on schooling of the next generation, we have
Et = (htNt)xtκtτt, (3.6)
where total income is given by (htNt) and the number of children per adult is xt.
Dividing by xt, we derive expenditures per student as
et = (htNt)κtτt. (3.7)
Dividing by total income produces the share of output spent on education per student
set = κtτt, (3.8)
which produces a measure of the total schooling cost a family faces for their children.





This measure, κt provides a measure of the efficiency of schooling parents face
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when making educational decisions for their children. As the marginal cost faced by
black families to send their children to school for an additional year was larger than
that faced by whites we would expect κt to be larger for black families than whites.
While one would expect this to be the case, no restrictions requiring κi,W,t < κi,B,t
were placed in the model.
3.3 Generating κt and κtτt from the Data
This section provides a detailed discussion of how the measures of (κi,R,tτi,R,t)
data
and κdatai,R,t are constructed using observable data. The data are from various sources
including state reports of the superintendent of education accessed from various state
archives as well as Margo’s Race and Schooling in the South, 1880-1950: An Economic
History. Population and earnings census data are accessed from the Integrated Public
Use Microdata Series (IPUMS).5
3.3.1 Population Estimation
3.3.1.1 Population Over Age 4 Not in School
To generate the population of 5 years and over not enrolled in school, we
take enrollment figures for white and black students, and using the age cohort data
provided by IPUMS. Let eri,R,t be the elementary school enrollment rate for the
relevant aged birth cohort (5-13) in the population, we compute a dis-enrollment rate
by computing
Elementary (Not Enrolled)i,R,t = (1− eri,R,t), (3.10)
5A full description of the data sources are provided in Appendix C.
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and if we let sri,R,t be the secondary school enrollment rate for the cohort aged 14-17,
we compute the rate of those not enrolled in a similar fashion, yielding
Secondary (Not Enrolled)i,R,t = (1− sri,R,t). (3.11)
Finally, if we let hri,R,t be the higher education enrollment rates for the population
aged 18-24, the rate of those not enrolled would be computed as
Higher Education (Not Enrolled)i,R,t = (1− hri,R,t). (3.12)
We take these age-relevant unenrolled rates and multiply them by the age relevant
populations for both blacks and whites separately to derive the population aged 5
and over not enrolled in school (P5Ni,R,t). This yields
P5Ni,R,t = (1− eri,R,t) ∗ P0513i,R,t + (1− sri,R,t) ∗ P1417i,R,t + (1− hri,R,t) ∗ P1824i,R,t.
(3.13)
3.3.2 Generating Average Earnings
While the computation of (κi,R,tτi,R,t)
data and κdatai,R,t requires a measure of earn-
ings for black and white households, the data needed to calculate incomes for families
by race exists for the years between 1940 and 1960, however no such data exist prior
to 1940. Therefore, we develop a method in which we can employ wage data from
1940 to estimate earnings for both races between 1890 and 1930.
Let Y datai,R,t be observed nominal earnings for households in state i of race R at
time t. As the data for 1940, 1950, and 1960 are provided IPUMS, these years do
not necessitate any additional computation. Years prior to 1940 require imputations
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in order to create nominal earnings. We assume that workers get 66% of output and
that white and black households face the same price level.
To generate values of Y datai,j,R,1890 through Y
data
i,j,R,1930, where j represents the oc-
cupation held by household worker i, we use 151 listed occupations that consistently
identified between 1890 and 1940 in the IPUMS data.6 We use nominal wages of
workers 25 to 64, who worked at least 35 hours per week and 35 weeks per year. The
following discussion presents the methods used to compute average earnings for the
years 1890-1930. The occupations are listed in Tables 8 through 10 in Appendix C.2.
Let ypwi,t be real output per worker given by Turner, Tamura, and Mulholland
(2013). We assume workers get 66% of output, thus we multiply ypwi,t by 0.66. Next,
as real output per worker is in 2000 dollars, we convert real output per worker to
nominal output per worker (Y PW i,t). In 1940, we observe the nominal output per
worker and wage earnings for each state in our analysis. We take the occupational
earnings from 1940 and generate a ratio of average nominal earnings to nominal





From this ratio, we can impute the average earnings for prior years 1890-1930 (de-
noted t − n in Equation 3.15, where n is the number of periods prior to t=1940) by
multiplying this ratio by nominal output per worker computed for 1890-1930, yielding





∗ Y PW i,t−n. (3.15)
6Note that since the data from the 1910 Census were lost in a fire, we geometrically interpolate
the missing values as required.
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We then compute the average nominal earnings by computing the averge over all
occupations, where the weights are the occupational distribution for whites and blacks
in each state in each year of observation, denoted as Yi,j,R,t−n. We average across
occupation j to provide a measure of average earnings for whites and blacks, weighted
by the occupational distribution for each race. The earnings for blacks and whites
computed via this method for each state are presented in Appendix C.4.
If we multiply average nominal earnings Yi,R,t−n by the size of the labor force
for each race (denoted Ni,R,t), we produce
Y Totali,R,t = Yi,R,tNi,R,t, (3.16)
which provides a measure of total earnings across each race in the sample period.
3.3.3 Generating κtτt from the Data
From Equation 3.8, we can develop a way to empirically test the model by
deriving an estimate of κi,R,tτi,R,t from the data if we take the share of total earnings
by race spent on education, divide by the number of students, and multiply it by the







where Total Education Expenditures divided by the Student Population in Equation
3.17 is per-pupil expenditures. Equation 3.17 is equal to κi,R,tτi,R,t:
sei,R,t = κi,R,tτi,R,t. (3.18)
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The next subsection presents the computational methods employed to develop
an empirical measure of κi,R,tτi,R,t and κi,R,t, which can then be tested against the
model generated values.
3.3.4 Generating κt
As the efficiency parameter of schooling, κi,R,t, is of major interest in this paper
for empirical tests, we need a measure of τi,R,t, which is expressed as the share of the
expected lifespan of children within their birth cohort in which they are expected to
seek education. To acquire this from within the data, we employ the same methods
as in Tamura and Simon (2017). We take expected years of schooling divided by a









thus in dividing sei,R,t derived in the model from Tamura, Simon, and Murphy (2016)




By identifying κi,R,t via the above relationship, we can compute a measure of the
efficiency of schooling faced by parents in their decision to submit their children to
an additional year of education.
Dividing (κi,R,tτi,R,t)
data by τdatai,R,t allows us to identify κ
data
i,R,t, which provides a
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measure of the efficiency of schooling for white and black students. This parameter
represents the marginal cost parents face when determining the amount of schooling
their children will seek. The computed values of κi,R,t are compared to the model
generated data in Appendix C.6.
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3.4 Empirical Analysis
3.4.1 Tests for κi,r,tτi,r,t
In this section, we empirically test the model’s predictions of κi,R,tτi,R,t and
κi,R,t with the values generated by the data. All data are expressed as natural
logs. Table 3.1 presents the summary statistics for the model and data generated
(κi,R,tτi,R,t)
data and κi,R,t in logarithmic form.
As we were unable to collect data regarding per-pupil expenditures for all states
in all years, we have only 85 total observations for each race. However Tamura, Simon,
and Murphy (2016) provide 143 observations. Therefore, we restrict the sample size
of the model-generated values to 85 by removing values of κi,R,tτi,R,t and κi,R,t if the
observed data for that state and year do not exist. As blacks face higher total time
and marginal costs of schooling relative to their white birth cohort, one would expect
these values to be higher.
As there were only 85 observations for each race, we combine the data for
both whites and blacks, thereby requiring the use of a multidimensional panel data
regression, in which there are observations for a representative white and black student
within each state in each year. The empirical specification we estimate is a fixed effects
multidimensional panel regression model with observations for state i and race R at
time t, taking the functional form
ln(κi,R,tτi,R,t)
data = c+ βln(κi,R,tτi,R,t)
model + γi + εi,R,t, (3.22)
where c is a constant, γi is a vector of state fixed effects, and εi,R,t is a zero-mean,
serially uncorrelated vector of residuals.
We also regress the data generated values of (κi,R,tτi,R,t)
data on the model
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics: Model and Data Generated Values for (κi,R,tτi,R,t)
data
and κi,R,t in Logarithmic Form
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max N
ln(κi,W,tτi,W,t)
model -1.406 0.579 -2.459 -1.667 85
ln(κi,B,tτi,B,t)
model -1.542 0.619 -2.821 -0.268 85
ln(κi,W,tτi,W,t)
data -3.312 0.756 -5.778 -1.722 85
ln(κi,B,tτi,B,t)
data -2.873 0.991 -7.182 -0.885 85
ln(κi,W,t)
model -0.595 0.428 -1.503 0.354 85
ln(κi,B,t)
model -0.343 0.408 -1.294 0.494 85
ln(κi,W,t)
data -1.307 0.744 -3.741 0.256 85
ln(κi,B,t)
data -0.833 0.984 -5.121 1.131 85
generated values using a dummy variable for race to indicate if the student is black,
treating whites as the reference group.7 The panel regression with a race dummy
takes the form of
ln(κi,R,tτi,R,t)
data = c+ βln(κi,R,tτi,R,t)
model + γB + εi,R,t, (3.23)
where γB is a vector of dummies indicating if the student is black, treating white
students as the reference group.
Our third specification utilizes a vector of time and state fixed effects
ln(κi,R,tτi,R,t)
data = c+ βln(κi,R,tτi,R,t)
model + γi + γt + εi,R,t, (3.24)
where γt is a vector of time fixed effects. As the majority of the data were only avail-
able from 1890-1960, with too few observations for 1890 to be successfully included
in the regression, this year is dropped from the computation, and we treat 1890 as
the reference year.
7To avoid issues of multicollinearity, we do not include state fixed effects in the race-dummy
model.
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Finally, our fourth regression specification employs the race dummy and time
fixed effects:8
ln(κi,R,tτi,R,t)
data = c+ βln(κi,R,tτi,R,t)
model + γR + γt + εi,R,t, (3.25)
If the model developed by Tamura, Simon, and Murphy (2016) is an accurate
descriptor of (κi,R,tτi,R,t)
data, then the estimated coefficient will be expected to be
equal to one.
The results for this exercise are presented in Table 3.2. In Model 1, in which
we include a vector of state fixed effects, we attain an estimated coefficient of 0.948 on
ln(κi,R,tτi,R,t)
model with significance at the 1% level. When including race fixed effects,
we find an estimated coefficient of 0.898 with significance at the 1% level, and an
estimated coefficient of 0.573 with significance at the 1% level for blacks. The inclusion
of year and state fixed effects in Model 3 reduces the coefficient on ln(κi,R,tτi,R,t)
model,
with no statistical significance within conventional bounds. However, the individual
year fixed effects models show an increase in the estimated coefficients with an increase
in time, coupled with increases in statistical significance in more recent years. Finally,
the fourth model, which includes year and race fixed effects shows a statistically
significant coefficient of 0.286 on ln(κi,R,tτi,R,t)
model at the 1% level. The inclusion of
a dummy for race shows that there is a significant coefficient on blacks of 0.481 at
the 1% level, and the pattern of the magnitude of the coefficients and increases in
statistical significance with the time fixed effects are similar to Model 3.
These results indicate that on average, holding all else constant, blacks faced
a much higher total cost of attendance than white families. In both models in which
a race dummy is included, we find a highly significant and positive effect on the total
8Again, we omit the state fixed effects to avoid multicollinearity.
105
Table 3.2: Regression Results for κi,R,tτi,R,t
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
State FE Race State/Time FE Time FE and Race
ln(κi,R,tτi,R,t)
model 0.948∗∗∗ 0.898∗∗∗ 0.0101 0.286∗∗

















Constant -1.676∗∗∗ -2.029∗∗∗ -3.757∗∗∗ -3.418∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 170 170 170 170
R2 0.382 0.381 0.462 0.533
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
cost of schooling of blacks relative to whites. These estimates support the model
solutions by Tamura, Simon, and Murphy (2016). In addition, these results also
confirm the assertions that blacks faced unequal access to education and can provide
an empirical justification for the reduced years of schooling blacks attained relative
to whites, and thus, reduced accumulation of human capital that followed.
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3.4.2 Tests for κi,r,t
We test for the fit of the data to the computed values of κi,R,t as well. We
include the following fixed effects panel model of the functional form
ln(κi,R,t)
data = c+ βln(κi,rR,t)
model + γi + εi,r,t, (3.26)
where κdatai,r,t is the vector of data-generated values of κi,R,t and κ
model
i,r,t is generated by
the model.
We also regress the data generated values of (κi,R,t)
data on the model generated
values using the race dummy in the previous set of specifications. The model takes
the functional form of
ln(κi,R,t)
data = c+ βln(κi,R,t)
model + γR + εi,R,t. (3.27)
Our third specification for the estimation of κi,R,t uses a vector of year and
state fixed effects of the form
ln(κi,R,t)
data = c+ βln(κi,R,t)
model + γi + γt + εi,R,t, (3.28)
Finally, we include a regression with race and time fixed effects:
ln(κi,R,t)
data = c+ βln(κi,R,t)
model + γR + γt + εi,R,t, (3.29)
where γt is a vector of time fixed effects. In addition, should the model accurately
describe the data generated values, we expect the estimated coefficients to be one.
The results for the regressions on κdatai,R,t are presented in Table 3.3. The esti-
mated coefficient in the state fixed effects regression is 1.213 with significance at the
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Table 3.3: Regression Results for κi,R,t
Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
State FE Race State/Time FE Time FE and Race
ln(κi,R,t)
model 1.213∗∗∗ 0.997∗∗∗ 0.238 0.146

















Constant -0.478∗∗∗ -0.689∗∗∗ -1.540∗∗∗ -1.883∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 170 170 170 170
R2 0.228 0.236 0.218 0.469
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
1% level. When including the race dummy, we find an estimate of 0.997 for κmodeli,R,t ,
with an estimated coefficient of 0.244 on black students with no statistical signifi-
cance within conventional bounds. While the results for the race dummy model are
not statistically significant, they are economically significant, indicating that blacks,
on average, holding all else constant, face higher marginal costs of attending an ad-
ditional year of school than their white counterparts within their birth cohort.
Model 7 presents the estimates for ln(κi,R,t)
model with time and state fixed
effects and Model 8 presents the estimates for the model with time fixed effects and
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a race dummy. The results in both Models 7 and 8 suggest that the year fixed effects
become more significant as the observations become more recent, however race in
Model 8 suggests an estimated coefficient of 0.443 for black students with significance
at the 1% level. Similar to Model 6, the results in Model 8 results suggest that black
students faced higher marginal costs of schooling relative to their white cohort.
The results for the tests on κi,R,t provide us with a number of interesting im-
plications. First, the regression model’s results suggest the model’s values of κi,R,t
provide a suitable fit with the data, thus giving evidence of the model’s explanatory
power in addressing the unequal access to education between black and white stu-
dents. Second, the estimated coefficients for κi,R,t in Models 6 and 8 suggest that
blacks faced much higher costs of schooling relative to white students, confirming
the predictions of Tamura, Simon, and Murphy (2016), explaining the disparity be-
tween white and black education and enrollment rates. As per-pupil funding for
black students was substantially lower than white funding, suggesting a lower quality
of education, along with lower incomes for black families than whites, these results
provide substantial evidence in the way of estimating the effects of discrimination
against blacks during the Jim Crow era.
The results regarding the tests of κi,R,tτi,R,t and κi,R,t, support the narrative
that as blacks faced higher costs of education relative to whites, black enrollment rates
fall and the expected schooling as a fraction of their life expectancy falls substantially
relative to white students. Thus, these results provide evidence to support the model
by Tamura, Simon, and Murphy (2016) in that human capital accumulates inter-
generationally, and that the stock of human capital held by the parents will determine
the the spillover of human capital to their progeny via the law of motion of human
capital relationship in Equation 3.2. As such, higher costs of educational attainment
coupled with lower human capital stocks of black parents lead to implications that
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despite the removal of discriminatory barriers faced by blacks to an equitable quality
of education to whites more than six decades ago, there is still a persistent differential
in educational performance and attainment between the two races.
110
3.5 Robustness Checks
3.5.1 Tests of κi,R,tτi,R,t and κi,R,t in Levels
As a robustness check, we include a regression of κi,R,tτi,R,t and κi,R,t in levels,
rather than natural logs.
Table 3.4 presents the summary statistics for the model generated values and
data for κi,R,tτi,R,t and κi,R,t in levels. It is of note that as the magnitudes of the data
in levels differ substantially from logged values in the main section of this paper. As
there are substantial differences between the log and level values in the dataset, we
do not expect the estimated coefficients to be similar to the regressions in which the
variables are expressed in logarithmic form.
Table 3.4: Summary Statistics: Model and Data Generated Values for κi,R,tτi,R,t and
κi,R,t in Levels
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max N
(κi,W,tτt)
model 0.288 0.167 0.058 0.846 85
(κi,B,tτt)
model 0.256 0.157 0.059 0.764 85
(κi,W,tτt)
data 0.085 0.043 0.021 0.225 85
(κi,B,tτt)
data 0.040 0.033 0.011 0.201 85
κmodeli,W,t 0.603 0.262 0.222 1.424 85
κmodeli,B,t 0.769 0.311 0.274 1.638 85
κdatai,W,t 0.186 0.079 0.044 0.405 85
κdatai,B,t 0.134 0.099 0.033 0.449 85
We first test the model for κi,R,tτi,R,t. The results are presented in Table 3.5.
The first two models, in which we include state fixed effects for both, and a race
dummy for the second, produce similar quantitative results, with coefficients of 0.189
on (κi,R,tτi,R,t)
model in the first specification, and 0.155 in the second, with statistical
significance at the 1% level in both estimations. The models in which we include
time fixed effects produce negative results for the coefficient on (κi,R,tτi,R,t)
model, with
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Table 3.5: Regression Results for κi,R,tτi,R,t in Levels
Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12
State FE Race State/Time FE Time FE and Race
(κi,R,tτi,R,t)
model 0.189∗∗∗ 0.155∗∗∗ -0.0720∗ -0.0174

















Constant 0.0148∗ 0.00294 0.0441∗∗∗ 0.0157∗∗
(0.086) (0.704) (0.000) (0.017)
Observations 170 170 170 170
R2 0.204 0.207 0.521 0.605
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
statistical significance at the 10% level in only the third specification. The fourth
specification, in which we include time fixed effects and a dummy for race does not
indicate statistical significance within conventional bounds for the (κi,R,tτi,R,t)
model
coefficient, however the coefficient on the race dummy is positive and significant at
the 1% level.
We next test the specification for κi,R,t in levels. The results are presented
in Table 3.6. The first two specifications suggest coefficients of 0.547 in the state
fixed effects model, and 0.368 in the specification in which we include a dummy for
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Table 3.6: Regression Results for κi,R,t
Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16
State FE Race State/Time FE Time FE and Race
κmodeli,R,t 0.547
∗∗ 0.368∗∗∗ -0.684∗∗ -0.0485

















Constant 0.126 0.129 0.608∗∗∗ 0.119∗∗
(0.379) (0.126) (0.000) (0.037)
Observations 170 170 170 170
R2 0.068 0.135 0.586 0.595
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
race, both of which display statistical significance at the 1% level. In addition, the
estimated race coefficient is 0.244, indicating higher values of κi,R,t for blacks than
whites, providing further evidence to the model by Tamura, Simon, and Murphy
(2016).
Similar to the test for κi,R,tτi,R,t in levels, the estimated coefficients for κi,R,t in
the time fixed effects specifications are negative, with statistical significance displayed
in only Model 15. However, the race coefficient is still positive and significant at the
1% level, again suggesting blacks faced higher opportunity costs of schooling relative
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to white students. In both tests, we note that the time fixed effects increase in




This paper presents a novel data set in which values for black and white per-
pupil educational expenditures were constructed to test the values generated by a
dynamic, dynastic human capital model developed by Tamura, Simon, and Murphy
(2016). The results of the empirical exercises suggest the model carries substantial
explanatory power in terms of accuracy of the initial calibrations, and also provides
substantial policy implications regarding the unequal access to education faced by
black families during the Jim Crow era.
This paper makes a number of substantial contributions to the literature re-
garding both human capital accumulation and unequal access to education. First, by
developing and presenting a novel data set in which we can account for differences
between per-pupil expenditures for white and black students as well as producing
estimates for the share of educational expenses allocated to white and black in con-
junction with the role these metrics play in determining the relative efficiency of
schooling between whites and blacks at the state level, we provide evidence of the
validity of the model developed by Tamura, Simon, and Murphy (2016). These results
also give measures of inequality faced by blacks relative to whites during Jim Crow.
The statistical analyses provide evidence to support the solutions to the model
developed by Tamura, Simon, and Murphy (2016) in that it confirms the fit of key
educational efficiency parameters calibrated in the initial theoretical framework. Our
results suggest that as blacks faced unequal access to education relative to their
white cohort, their costs of attendance were much higher, thereby spending less time
in school than whites. As human capital is passed down inter-generationally from
parents to their children, parents with low levels of schooling will likely raise children
with similarly low levels of schooling as well. These results provide serious implica-
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tions regarding the effects of race-based segregationist policy in the United States,
as suggested by consistently lower high school graduation rates of blacks relative to
whites even after the end of Jim Crow and the removial of other racially discrim-
inatory institutionalized barriers to the equal access to public facilities (including
education).
Given the nature of the inter-generational spillovers of human capital from the
parents to their children, the data presented within this paper suggest that for the
time sample provided, 8 decades of segregation and racial discrimination lead to black
families facing substantial challenges up in the accumulation of human capital relative
to whites. The results from this paper are robust to changes in the specification
and transformations on the data, and all suggest a similar result; unequal access to
education reduced the ability of black families to develop and pass on human capital
to the next generation relative to whites, and the ramifications of Segregation era
policy in the South are still experienced to this day.
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Appendix A Bank Lending and the Risk Channel
of Monetary Policy Appendices
A.1 Data and Sources
Table 7: Data and Sources
Variable Source
Real GDP Federal Reserve Economic Database (FRED)
Consumer Prices Federal Reserve Economic Database (FRED)
Reserve Balances Federal Reserve Economic Database (FRED)
10 Year Treasury Yield Federal Reserve Economic Database (FRED)
Bank Lending Standards Federal Reserve Economic Database (FRED)
Bank Lending Margins Federal Reserve Economic Database (FRED)
Shadow Federal Funds Rate Jing Cynthia Wu’s Webpage
Effective Federal Funds Rate Federal Reserve Economic Database (FRED)
Interest on Excess Reserves Federal Reserve Economic Database (FRED)
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A.2 Alternative Interest Rate Forecast Error Variance De-
composition
Figure 3: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition (Bernanke Taylor Rule)
Figure 4: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition (Shadow Federal Funds Rate)
121
Appendix B Spillovers of United States Quantita-
tive Easing Appendices
B.1 Impulse Responses
B.1.1 United States Impulse Responses
Figure 5: United States Impulse Responses
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B.1.2 Advanced Economy VAR Impulse Responses
Figure 6: Advanced Economy Industrial Production Impulse Responses
Figure 7: Advanced Economy Consumer Price Impulse Responses
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Figure 8: Advanced Economy Money Supply Impulse Responses
Figure 9: Advanced Economy Long Rate Impulse Responses
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Figure 10: Advanced Economy Short Rate Impulse Responses
Figure 11: Advanced Economy Equity Price Impulse Responses
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Figure 12: Advanced Economy Exchange Rate Impulse Responses
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B.1.3 Emerging Market Economy VAR Impulse Responses
Figure 13: Emerging Market Economy Industrial Production Impulse Responses
Figure 14: Emerging Market Economy Consumer Price Impulse Responses
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Figure 15: Emerging Market Economy Money Supply Impulse Responses
Figure 16: Emerging Market Economy Long Rate Impulse Responses
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Figure 17: Emerging Market Economy Short Rate Impulse Responses
Figure 18: Emerging Market Economy Equity Price Impulse Responses
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Figure 19: Emerging Market Economy Exchange Rate Impulse Responses
130
B.2 Forecast Error Variance Decompositons
B.2.1 United States
Figure 20: United States Forecast Error Variance Decompositions
131
B.2.2 Advanced Economies
Figure 21: Advanced Economy Industrial Production Forecast Error Variance De-
compositions
Figure 22: Advanced Economy Consumer Prices Forecast Error Variance Decompo-
sitions
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Figure 23: Advanced Economy Money Supply Forecast Error Variance Decomposi-
tions
Figure 24: Advanced Economy Long Rate Forecast Error Variance Decompositions
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Figure 25: Advanced Economy Short Rate Forecast Error Variance Decompositions
Figure 26: Advanced Economy Equity Prices Forecast Error Variance Decompositions
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Figure 27: Advanced Economy Exchange Rate Forecast Error Variance Decomposi-
tions
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B.2.3 Emerging Market Economies
Figure 28: Emerging Market Economy Industrial Production Forecast Error Variance
Decompositions
Figure 29: Emerging Market Economy Prices Forecast Error Variance Decompositions
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Figure 30: Emerging Market Economy Money Supply Forecast Error Variance De-
compositions
Figure 31: Emerging Market Economy Long Rate Forecast Error Variance Decompo-
sitions
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Figure 32: Emerging Market Economy Short Rate Forecast Error Variance Decom-
positions
Figure 33: Emerging Market Economy Equity Prices Forecast Error Variance Decom-
positions
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Figure 34: Emerging Market Economy Exchange Rate Forecast Error Variance De-
compositions
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B.3 Pre-Crisis Trade Weights
B.3.1 Advanced Economies
Figure 35: Advanced Economy Industrial Production Impulse Responses
Figure 36: Advanced Economy Consumer Prices Impulse Responses
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Figure 37: Advanced Economy Narrow Money Impulse Responses
Figure 38: Advanced Economy Long Rate Impulse Responses
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Figure 39: Advanced Economy Short Rate Impulse Responses
Figure 40: Advanced Economy Equity Prices Impulse Responses
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Figure 41: Advanced Economy Exchange Rate Impulse Responses
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B.3.2 Emerging Market Economies
Figure 42: Emerging Market Economy Industrial Production Impulse Responses
Figure 43: Emerging Market Economy Consumer Prices Impulse Responses
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Figure 44: Emerging Market Economy Narrow Money Impulse Responses
Figure 45: Emerging Market Economy Long Rate Impulse Responses
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Figure 46: Emerging Market Economy Short Rate Impulse Responses
Figure 47: Emerging Market Economy Equity Prices Impulse Responses
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Figure 48: Emerging Market Economy Exchange Rate Impulse Responses
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B.4 Pre-Crisis Sample Period
B.4.1 Advanced Economies
Figure 49: Advanced Economy Industrial Production (Pre-Crisis Period)
Figure 50: Advanced Economy Consumer Prices (Pre-Crisis Period)
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Figure 51: Advanced Economy Narrow Money (Pre-Crisis Period)
Figure 52: Advanced Economy Long Rate (Pre-Crisis Period)
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Figure 53: Advanced Economy Equity Prices (Pre-Crisis Period)
Figure 54: Advanced Economy Exchange Rate (Pre-Crisis Period)
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B.4.2 Emerging Market Economies
Figure 55: Emerging Market Economy Industrial Production (Pre-Crisis Period)
Figure 56: Emerging Market Economy Consumer Prices (Pre-Crisis Period)
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Figure 57: Emerging Market Economy Narrow Money (Pre-Crisis Period)
Figure 58: Emerging Market Economy Long Rate (Pre-Crisis Period)
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Figure 59: Emerging Market Economy Short Rate (Pre-Crisis Period)
Figure 60: Emerging Market Economy Equity Prices (Pre-Crisis Period)
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Figure 61: Emerging Market Economy Exchange Rate (Pre-Crisis Period)
154
B.5 Alternative Identification Scheme
B.5.1 Advanced Economies
Figure 62: Advanced Economy Industrial Production (Alternative Identification
Scheme)
Figure 63: Advanced Economy Consumer Prices (Alternative Identification Scheme)
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Figure 64: Advanced Economy Narrow Money (Alternative Identification Scheme)
Figure 65: Advanced Economy Long Rate (Alternative Identification Scheme)
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Figure 66: Advanced Economy Short Rate (Alternative Identification Scheme)
Figure 67: Advanced Economy Equity Prices (Alternative Identification Scheme)
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Figure 68: Advanced Economy Exchange Rate (Alternative Identification Scheme)
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B.5.2 Emerging Market Economies
Figure 69: Emerging Market Economy Industrial Production (Alternative Identifica-
tion Scheme)
Figure 70: Emerging Market Economy Consumer Prices (Alternative Identification
Scheme)
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Figure 71: Emerging Market Economy Narrow Money (Alternative Identification
Scheme)
Figure 72: Emerging Market Economy Long Rate (Alternative Identification Scheme)
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Figure 73: Emerging Market Economy Short Rate (Alternative Identification Scheme)
Figure 74: Emerging Market Economy Equity Prices (Alternative Identification
Scheme)
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Figure 75: Emerging Market Economy Exchange Rate (Alternative Identification
Scheme)
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B.6 Variation in Restriction Horizon
B.6.1 Advanced Economies: One Month Restriction Horizon
Figure 76: Advanced Economy Industrial Production (One Month Restriction Hori-
zon)
Figure 77: Advanced Economy Consumer Prices (One Month Restriction Horizon)
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Figure 78: Advanced Economy Narrow Money (One Month Restriction Horizon)
Figure 79: Advanced Economy Long Rate (One Month Restriction Horizon)
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Figure 80: Advanced Economy Short Rate (One Month Restriction Horizon)
Figure 81: Advanced Economy Equity Prices (One Month Restriction Horizon)
165
Figure 82: Advanced Economy Exchange Rate (One Month Restriction Horizon)
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B.6.2 Emerging Market Economies: One Month Restriction Horizon
Figure 83: Emerging Market Economy Industrial Production (One Month Restriction
Horizon)
Figure 84: Emerging Market Economy Consumer Prices (One Month Restriction
Horizon)
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Figure 85: Emerging Market Economy Narrow Money (One Month Restriction Hori-
zon)
Figure 86: Emerging Market Economy Long Rate (One Month Restriction Horizon)
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Figure 87: Emerging Market Economy Short Rate (One Month Restriction Horizon)
Figure 88: Emerging Market Economy Equity Prices (One Month Restriction Hori-
zon)
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Figure 89: Emerging Market Economy Exchange Rate (One Month Restriction Hori-
zon)
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B.6.3 Advanced Economies: Three Month Restriction Horizon
Figure 90: Advanced Economy Industrial Production (Three Month Restriction Hori-
zon)
Figure 91: Advanced Economy Consumer Prices (Three Month Restriction Horizon)
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Figure 92: Advanced Economy Narrow Money (Three Month Restriction Horizon)
Figure 93: Advanced Economy Long Rate (Three Month Restriction Horizon)
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Figure 94: Advanced Economy Short Rate (Three Month Restriction Horizon)
Figure 95: Advanced Economy Equity Prices (Three Month Restriction Horizon)
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Figure 96: Advanced Economy Exchange Rate (Three Month Restriction Horizon)
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B.6.4 Emerging Market Economies: Three Month Restriction Horizon
Figure 97: Emerging Market Economy Industrial Production (Three Month Restric-
tion Horizon)
Figure 98: Emerging Market Economy Consumer Prices (Three Month Restriction
Horizon)
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Figure 99: Emerging Market Economy Narrow Money (Three Month Restriction
Horizon)
Figure 100: Emerging Market Economy Long Rate (Three Month Restriction Hori-
zon)
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Figure 101: Emerging Market Economy Short Rate (Three Month Restriction Hori-
zon)
Figure 102: Emerging Market Economy Equity Prices (Three Month Restriction Hori-
zon)
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Figure 103: Emerging Market Economy Exchange Rate (Three Month Restriction
Horizon)
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B.6.5 Advanced Economies: Nine Month Restriction Horizon
Figure 104: Advanced Economy Industrial Production (Nine Month Restriction Hori-
zon)
Figure 105: Advanced Economy Consumer Prices (Nine Month Restriction Horizon)
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Figure 106: Advanced Economy Narrow Money (Nine Month Restriction Horizon)
Figure 107: Advanced Economy Long Rate (Nine Month Restriction Horizon)
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Figure 108: Advanced Economy Short Rate (Nine Month Restriction Horizon)
Figure 109: Advanced Economy Equity Prices (Nine Month Restriction Horizon)
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Figure 110: Advanced Economy Exchange Rate (Nine Month Restriction Horizon)
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B.6.6 Emerging Market Economies: Nine Month Restriction Horizon
Figure 111: Emerging Market Economy Industrial Production (Nine Month Restric-
tion Horizon)
Figure 112: Emerging Market Economy Consumer Prices (Nine Month Restriction
Horizon)
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Figure 113: Emerging Market Economy Narrow Money (Nine Month Restriction
Horizon)
Figure 114: Emerging Market Economy Long Rate (Nine Month Restriction Horizon)
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Figure 115: Emerging Market Economy Short Rate (Nine Month Restriction Horizon)
Figure 116: Emerging Market Economy Equity Prices (Nine Month Restriction Hori-
zon)
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Figure 117: Emerging Market Economy Exchange Rate (Nine Month Restriction
Horizon)
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B.6.7 Advanced Economies: Twelve Month Restriction Horizon
Figure 118: Advanced Economy Industrial Production (Twelve Month Restriction
Horizon)
Figure 119: Advanced Economy Consumer Prices (Twelve Month Restriction Hori-
zon)
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Figure 120: Advanced Economy Narrow Money (Twelve Month Restriction Horizon)
Figure 121: Advanced Economy Long Rate (Twelve Month Restriction Horizon)
s
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Figure 122: Advanced Economy Short Rate (Twelve Month Restriction Horizon)
Figure 123: Advanced Economy Equity Prices (Twelve Month Restriction Horizon)
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Figure 124: Advanced Economy Exchange Rate (Twelve Month Restriction Horizon)
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B.6.8 Emerging Market Economies: Twelve Month Restriction Horizon
Figure 125: Emerging Market Economy Industrial Production (Twelve Month Re-
striction Horizon)
Figure 126: Emerging Market Economy Consumer Prices (Twelve Month Restriction
Horizon)
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Figure 127: Emerging Market Economy Narrow Money (Twelve Month Restriction
Horizon)
Figure 128: Emerging Market Economy Long Rate (Twelve Month Restriction Hori-
zon)
192
Figure 129: Emerging Market Economy Short Rate (Twelve Month Restriction Hori-
zon)
Figure 130: Emerging Market Economy Equity Prices (Twelve Month Restriction
Horizon)
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Figure 131: Emerging Market Economy Exchange Rate (Twelve Month Restriction
Horizon)
194




Per-pupil expenditures data for 1890, 1910, 1935, and 1950 are from Race and
Schooling in the South, 1880-1950: An Economic History, and are reported in 1950
dollars. We adjust these figures for inflation to their respective years. Expenditures
for 1929 and 1944 are from “The Education of Negroes in Alabama”.
C.1.2 Arkansas
Per-pupil expenditure data for 1910, 1935, and 1950 come from Race and
Schooling in the South, 1880-1950: An Economic History. The available data are for
1910, 1935, and 1950, and are reported in 1950 dollars, thus we adjust these values
for inflation to their respective years. We geometrically interpolate the missing data.
C.1.3 Delaware
Per-pupil expenditures for 1910, 1935, and 1950 are from Race and Schooling
in the South, 1880-1950: An Economic History. The available data are for 1910,
1935, and 1950, and are reported in 1950 dollars, thus we adjust these values for
inflation to their respective years.
C.1.4 Florida
Per-pupil expenditure data for 1890 and 1950 are from Race and Schooling
in the South, 1880-1950: An Economic History. The 1890 value is reported in 1950
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dollars, so it is adjusted for inflation. Expenditure data for 1900, 1905, 1910, 1915,
1920, 1925, 1928, 1930, 1935, 1936, 1939, and 1940 are from various releases of the
Biennial Report of the Superintendent of Public Instruction of the State of Florida.
We geometrically interpolate missing data.
C.1.5 Georgia
Per-pupil expenditure data for the years 1910, 1935, and 1950 are from Race
and Schooling in the South, 1880-1950: An Economic History. Data for 1929 and
1944 are from “The Education of Negroes in Georgia”, published in The Journal of
Negro Education.
C.1.6 Kentucky
Per-pupil expenditure data for Kentucky were not available and thus this state
is omitted from the analysis.
C.1.7 Louisiana
Data for Louisiana regarding per-pupil expenditures come from “The Educa-
tion of Negroes in Louisiana”. We next pull from Race and Schooling in the South,
1880-1950: An Economic History for the years 1890, 1910, 1935, and 1950. Data
from this source are reported in 1950 dollars, and we thus adjust all of the values
for inflation to their respective years. The data available for per-pupil expenditures
are for 1890 through 1965 for both black and white students. Values that were not
available in our sources are geometrically interpolated.
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C.1.8 Maryland
Per-pupil expenditure data for the years 1890, 1910, 1935, and 1950 come
from Race and Schooling in the South, 1880-1950: An Economic History. Data for
1929 and 1944 come from “The Education of Negroes in Louisiana”. Values missing
from our sources were geometrically interpolated. These years are reported in 1950
dollars, so we adjust all values for inflation to their respective years. Data for 1920,
1925-1930, 1940, came from The Annual Report of the State Board of Education for
Maryland for their respective years and 1944 came from “The Education of Negroes
in Maryland”, published in The Journal of Negro Education.
C.1.9 Mississippi
Per-pupil expenditure data for the years 1890, 1910, 1935, and 1950 come from
Race and Schooling in the South, 1880-1950: An Economic History. Data from this
source are reported in 1950 dollars, and we thus adjust all of the values for inflation
to their respective years. Data for 1929 come from “The Education of Negroes in
Mississippi”. Missing values were geometrically interpolated.
C.1.10 North Carolina
Per-pupil expenditure data for 1890, 1910, 1935, and 1950 come from Race and
Schooling in the South, 1880-1950: An Economic History. These data are reported
in 1950 dollars and are thus adjusted for inflation. Data for 1904, 1909, 1914, 1919,
and 1930 come from various reports of the superintendent of public instruction for
North Carolina. Data for 1929 and 1944 are taken from “The Education of Negroes




Per pupil expenditure data for 1929 and 1944 come from “The Education of
Negroes in Mississippi”, published in The Journal of Negro Education. Years with
data that were not available between these values were geometrically interpolated.
C.1.12 South Carolina
Per-pupil expenditure data for 1910, 1935, and 1950 come from Race and
Schooling in the South, 1880-1950: An Economic History. These data are reported
in 1950 dollars, and are thus adjusted for inflation to their respective years. Data
for 1929 and 1944 are taken from “The Education of Negroes in North Carolina”,
published in The Journal of Negro Education. Values between these years that were
not available in our sources were geometrically interpolated.
C.1.13 Tennessee
Per-pupil expenditure data for 1910, 1935, and 1950 come from Race and
Schooling in the South, 1880-1950: An Economic History. These data are reported
in 1950 dollars, and are thus adjusted for inflation to their respective years. Data for
1929 and 1944 are taken from “The Education of Negroes in Tennessee”, published
in The Journal of Negro Education.
C.1.14 Texas
Per-pupil expenditure data for 1910, 1935, and 1950 come from Race and
Schooling in the South, 1880-1950: An Economic History. These data are reported
in 1950 dollars, therefore we adjust these values for inflation to their respective




For per-pupil expenditures, data for 1890, 1910, 1935, and 1950 come from
Race and Schooling in the South, 1880-1950: An Economic History. These values are
provided in 1950 dollars, and are thus adjusted for inflation to their respective years.
Dat afor 1941 and 1943 come from the Annual Report of the Superintendent of Public
Instruction for their respective years. Missing values were geometrically interpolated.
C.1.16 West Virginia
Per-pupil expenditures and class size data for West Virginia were not available
and thus this state is omitted from the analysis.
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C.2 Tables
Table 8: Occupations Included in Earnings Imputations
Advertising Agents and Salesmen Dressmakers and Seamstresses, Not Factory
Agents Dyers
Apprentices, Building Trades Editors and Reporters
Artists and Art Teachers Electrical Engineers
Attendants and Assistants, Library Electricians
Attendants, Hospital and Other Inst. Electrician Apprentice
Attendants, Physicians And Dentists Office Electrotypers and Stereotypers
Bakers Engravers
Barbers, Beauticians, And Manicurists Entertainers
Blacksmiths Express Messengers and Railway Mail Clerks
Boarding And Lodging House Keepers Farm and Home Management Advisors
Boatmen, Canalmen, And Lock Keepers Farm Foremen
Boilermakers Farm Laborers-Unpaid Family Workers
Brakemen, Railroad Farm Laborers-Wage Workers
Brickmasons, Stonemasons, and Tile Setters Farm Managers
Buyers and Dept. Heads, Store Farmers (Owners and Tenants)
Buyers and Shippers, Farm Products Fillers/Grinders/Polishers (Metal)
Carpenters Firemen
Cement and Concrete Finshers Fishermen
Chairmen, Rodmen, and Axemen, Surveying Foremen
Chemists Funeral Directors and Embalmers
Civil Engineers Furnacemen, Smeltermen, and Pourers
Clergymen Guards, Watchmen, and Doorkeepers
Clerical and Kindred Workers Heat Treaters, Annealers, Temperers
Collectors, Bill and Account Heaters, Metal
Compositors and Typesetters Housekeepers (Not Private Household)
Conductors, Bus, Street, and Railway Housekeepers (Private Household)
Conductors, Railroad Hucksters and Peddlers
Cooks, Except Private Household Industrial Engineers
Cranemen, Derrickmen, Hoistmen Inspectors
Credit Men Inspectors (Public Administration)
Decorators and Window Dressers Inspectors, Scalers, and Graders (Log Admin)
Deliverymen and Routemen Insurance Agents and Brokers
Dentists Jaitors and Sextons
Designers Jewelers, Watchmakers, Goldsmiths
Draftsmen Laborers
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Table 9: Occupations Included in Earnings Imputations (Continued)
Laundry and Dry Cleaning Operatives Physicians and Surgeons
Laywers and Judges Plasterers
Librarians Plumbers and Pipe Fitters
Linemen and Servicemen, Telegraph, Telephone Plumbers and Pipe Fitters (Apprentice)
Locomotive Engineers Policemen and Detectives
Locomotive Firemen Postmasters
Loom Fixers Power Station Operatives
Lumbermen, Raftsmen, and Woodchoppers Practical Nurses
Machinists Pressmen and Plate Printers (Printing)
Mail Carriers Private Household Workers
Managers, Officials, and Proprietors Professional Household Workers
Marshals and Constables Purchasing Agents and Buyers
Meat Cutters, Except Slaughter and Packing House Railroad Repairmen
Mechanical Engineers Real Estate Agents and Brokers
Mechanics and Repairmen Rollers and Roll HAnds (Metal)
Members of the Armed Services Roofers and Slaters
Metallurgists Sailors and Deck Hands
Millwrights Salesmen and Sales Clerks
Mine Operatives and Laborers Sawyers
Molders, Metal Service Workers (not Private Household)
Motormen, Mine, Factory, Logging Camp, Etc. Sheriffs and Bailiffs
Motormen; Street, Subway, Elevated Railway Shipping and Receiving Clerks
Musicians and Music Teachers Shoemakers/Repairers (Not Factory)
N/A (Blank) Social Workers
Newsboys Sports OFficials and Instructors
Nurses, Professional Stationary Engineers
Occupation Not Listed Stationary Firemen
Office Machine Operators Steonographers, Typists, and Secretaries
Officials and Public Administrators Stock and Bond Salesmen
Oilers and Greasers (Except Auto) Structural Metal Workers
Operatives and Kindred Workers Professors and Instructors
Painters, Construction and Maintenance Switchmen, Railroad
Painters (Other) Tailors and Tailoresses
Pharmacists Teachers
Photoengravers and Lithographers Teamsters
Photographic and Process Workers Telegraph Operators
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Table 10: Occupations Included in Earnings Imputations (Continued)
Testing Technicians Waiters and Waitresses
Therapists and Healers Watchmen (Crossing) and Bridge Tenders
Ticket Station, and Express Agents Welders and Flame Cutters
Upholsterers
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C.3 Per Pupil Expenditures
Figure 132: Alabama Log Per Pupil Expenditures (Nominal)
Figure 133: Arkansas Log Per Pupil Expenditures (Nominal)
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Figure 134: Delaware Log Per Pupil Expenditures (Nominal)
Figure 135: Florida Log Per Pupil Expenditures (Nominal)
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Figure 136: Georgia Log Per Pupil Expenditures (Nominal)
Figure 137: Louisiana Log Per Pupil Expenditures (Nominal)
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Figure 138: Maryland Log Per Pupil Expenditures (Nominal)
Figure 139: Mississippi Log Per Pupil Expenditures (Nominal)
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Figure 140: North Carolina Log Per Pupil Expenditures (Nominal)
Figure 141: South Carolina Log Per Pupil Expenditures (Nominal)
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Figure 142: Tennessee Log Per Pupil Expenditures (Nominal)
Figure 143: Texas Log Per Pupil Expenditures (Nominal)
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Figure 144: Virginia Log Per Pupil Expenditures (Nominal)
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C.4 Earnings Data
Figure 145: Alabama Log Earnings (Nominal)
Figure 146: Arkansas Log Earnings (Nominal)
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Figure 147: Delaware Log Earnings (Nominal)
Figure 148: Florida Log Earnings (Nominal)
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Figure 149: Georgia Log Earnings (Nominal)
Figure 150: Louisiana Log Earnings (Nominal)
212
Figure 151: Maryland Log Earnings (Nominal)
Figure 152: Mississippi Log Earnings (Nominal)
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Figure 153: North Carolina Log Earnings (Nominal)
Figure 154: South Carolina Log Earnings (Nominal)
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Figure 155: Tennessee Log Earnings (Nominal)
Figure 156: Texas Log Earnings (Nominal)
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Figure 157: Virginia Log Earnings (Nominal)
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C.5 κi,R,tτi,R,t Model and Data Comparisons
Figure 158: Alabama Log Kappa Tau
Figure 159: Arkansas Log Kappa Tau
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Figure 160: Delaware Log Kappa Tau
Figure 161: Florida Log Kappa Tau
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Figure 162: Georgia Log Kappa Tau
Figure 163: Louisiana Log Kappa Tau
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Figure 164: Maryland Log Kappa Tau
Figure 165: Mississippi Log Kappa Tau
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Figure 166: North Carolina Log Kappa Tau
Figure 167: South Carolina Log Kappa Tau
221
Figure 168: Tennessee Log Kappa Tau
Figure 169: Texas Log Kappa Tau
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Figure 170: Virginia Log Kappa Tau
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C.6 κi,R,t Model and Data Comparisons
Figure 171: Alabama Log Kappa
Figure 172: Arkansas Log Kappa
224
Figure 173: Delaware Log Kappa
Figure 174: Florida Log Kappa
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Figure 175: Georgia Log Kappa
Figure 176: Louisiana Log Kappa
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Figure 177: Maryland Log Kappa
Figure 178: Mississippi Log Kappa
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Figure 179: North Carolina Log Kappa
Figure 180: South Carolina Log Kappa
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Figure 181: Tennessee Log Kappa
Figure 182: Texas Log Kappa
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Figure 183: Virginia Log Kappa
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